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THE WEIGHT OF THE POOR . . .

A STRATEGY TO END POVERTY

RICHARD A. CLOWARD and FRANCES FOX PIVEN

SANTO DOMINGO . . .

Unfinished Revolution

SIDNEY LENS

MOSCOW CONGRESS 1966 . . .

The Old Party and the Young People

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

BOOKS

The Asia Trap: 2 Views

JONATHAN MIRSKY

18 Books on Vietnam: A Reader's Guide

Newspaper

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LETTERS

Nkrumah

London

DEAR SIRS: Granting some of the criticisms of Nkrumah such as the personality cult, and his insularity from his people, I must protest many of the accusations raised by J. Kirk Sale ["And Now Nkrumah: The Generals & the Future of Africa," *The Nation,* Mar. 21]. . . . I must remind your readers that Ghana, more than any other African colonial territory, had a very substantial British traditional middle class geared to British interests. Most of the capital of the country was in British hands. . . . All imported goods were distributed through foreign firms. Foreign banks held one-third of the foreign currency reserves. This meant that the conservative press in every country published hostile reports as soon as Nkrumah showed that he wanted to rid his country of neo-colonialism. Under the British, 50 per cent of foreign currency came from one industry—cocoa. In 1956, when Nkrumah tried to increase its output from 264,000 tons to 590,000 tons, manipulations of the market reduced the price from £500 to £85 in 1965. The cocoa price disaster seems to have been the cause of much of the criticism of Nkrumah's downfall. Excellent programs were commenced before this cocoa trouble: the Volta Dam, the Tema Harbour and the Velta Smelting were all reasonable projects. So was the tremendous effort for education. . . . Nkrumah has been deposed by unconstitutional methods, by people not known for their forward-looking ideas, certainly not socialistic. The march forward to African development has taken a nasty turn and if the capitalist press is heartened by events, African progress has been weakened.

Frida Laski

drugs abroad

Chicago, Ill.

DEAR SIRS: Robert Sherrill fails to point out ["Razz-ma-Tazz in the Drug Industry," *The Nation,* Apr. 11] that DMSO, according to *The Wall Street Journal,* is being marketed in Mexico, Spain and Germany. The whole field of overseas operations by U.S. companies—from an ethical standpoint—would seem to merit an article.

Peter D. Noerdlinger

gone stale

New York City

DEAR SIRS: A small point: could you bar contributors, just for a little while, from characterizing things as "an exercise in. . ."? Howard Zinn, in your issue of Apr. 4, announces that his piece on "The Old Left and the New" will be, primarily, "an exercise in contrasts." Newspaper columnists keep calling the Vietnamese war—truly, but monotonously—"an exercise in futility." Even the facile Red Smith loses his hold on his glittering marbles long enough to describe the Clay-Chavalo fight, God help us, as "an exercise in monotony." Enough already!

Ken Eisler

protest and punishment

Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR SIRS: In his recent article ["Law, Speech and Disobedience," *The Nation,* Mar. 28], Carl Cohen accepts the rules of law as governing the approaches to the problems raised by the Ann Arbor draft board sit-in, and in so doing immediately makes necessary the conclusions which he reaches only several pages later. In a crude sense, the law is made to preserve the *status quo,* which

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EDITORIALS

Theologians of the Cold War

The present agitation in the State Department over General de Gaulle's intention to quit NATO casts an unflattering light on the Department's top personnel, from Secretary Rusk down. The Department is predominantly staffed with deadheads, and the support of some astute consultants, like Dean Acheson, does not seem to help much. Acheson may in fact be typical; he was adaptable once, but that is no help now. *Newsweek* refers to Ball, Acheson, the recently deputized McCloy, J. Robert Schaetzel and Harlan Cleveland as "theologians," but the comparison is unjust to the many religious theoreticians who, even with advancing years, remain flexible and intellectually courageous. And not lacking in a saving sense of humor.

What is needed is a re-examination of some frozen U.S. assumptions. The world has not stood still since Winston Churchill formally launched the cold war at Fulton, Mo., and President Truman laid down the Truman Doctrine. De Gaulle is an old man, but he manages to keep abreast of change, or at least not to lag too far behind it. Witness his stand on Vietnam, his establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China, his handling of the former French colonies, his imperturbability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One might think that our diplomats would regard these moves as indications that de Gaulle's ideas should not be blindly opposed, but there has been little sign of an inclination to listen and learn.

De Gaulle's announcement that France expects us to be out of his domain, troops and installations, by April 1, 1967, presents both problems and opportunities for all the nations involved. The problems are obvious; the opportunities our people fail to see. Actually, adjustments which might arouse opposition among our allies if we proposed them would be facilitated if the initiative came from de Gaulle, but the theologians insist that the *status quo* is sacred.

The present phase of the NATO controversy was initiated by the withdrawal of 15,000 U.S. troops for service in Vietnam or for training purposes connected with our commitments in Vietnam, which become more shaky with every passing week. The situation has greatly elevated the mood of the Spanish generals. They have chafed under the 1953 pact which, in return for generous rentals and beefing up of Spanish forces, has given the United States four big bases and certain other facilities in Spain. But there is no treaty of alliance, and Spain has been kept out of NATO. Franco and his commanders now hope for admission. This is probably wishful thinking but, though there are plenty of obstacles, it might result in a deal involving Gibraltar, as by making it an Anglo-Spanish NATO base.

Cheer has also come to such Germans as Franz-Josef Strauss, with whom *U. S. News & World Report* foresightedly set up the interview it published in its April 18 issue. Strauss is no fool, and the questions were not the usual pap, so he had a chance to make some incisive observations. He said that Europe should take a larger share of the defense burden, that de Gaulle is right when he demands greater European responsibility, that the United States could well transfer one or two divisions out of the 350,000 American

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soldiers now in Europe. "Isn't it absolutely unnatural that a quarter billion European Europeans can't defend themselves?" Strauss asked. There were also cautious allusions to Strauss' underlying yearnings—an independent European (read West German) nuclear capability, a German general staff. Strauss made it all sound quite reasonable, but of course Strauss is Strauss, Germany is Germany and can again get out of hand. The lesson for our State Department is the example of cool, seemingly objective analysis that Strauss presented. Why can't our people talk like that?

Instead they sass de Gaulle and try to push him around. He is not easy to push. His basic ideas are quite sound, and he has some legitimate grievances based on past relations which are only now coming to light. The pressures for our pulling out entirely will mount, and even a partial withdrawal might give Germany a chance to slip into the driver's seat. That, by all indications, the Soviets will not stand for, so we are going to have problems which would tax the ingenuity of more capable diplomats than those now representing us.

The subject should not be left without a reference to the consequences of our folly in Vietnam. There is no reason why Europeans—or Asians, or anyone—should trust and respect a nation which allows itself to get into such an impasse. If we could extricate ourselves, and make some changes in the State Department hierarchy, we could maneuver more freely and to better purpose.

The Message Received

In the past two weeks, a striking change has occurred in the attitude of Congressmen toward the Vietnamese war. Some prominent hawks have begun to hedge so eagerly that one can hardly distinguish their cries from the cooing of the despised doves. The reasonable tones of Rep. Charles E. Bennett and Sen. Richard B. Russell were noted last week; since then a kind of consensus has developed among hawks, doves and other fowl whose species is not yet determined by Washington ornithologists. Javits, Tower, Hartke, Cooper, Saltonstall, Aiken, Mansfield are among those who have unbosomed themselves, but perhaps the strangest pronouncement came from Gerald Ford, the Republican spokesman in the House, who declared that the President would have to use more air and sea power or send in as many as 220,000 more troops to achieve "even a stalemate in Vietnam, and to gain a cease-fire in a war that now looks like a war without end."

What words are these? *Gain* a cease-fire?—that is what the Vietcong should be saying. And what manner of hawk is it that is dismayed by a war without end?

The swing to moderation almost certainly has something to do with the Easter recess, utilized by all Representatives and by those Senators who must face the voters in November to assess their chances of re-election. What the Congressmen discovered, evidently, is that the folks back home are not breathing fire toward the little Vietnamese brethren. There has never in the history of the Republic been such a stampede by the young to avoid military service. A book on how to make a good showing on the draft-deferment test is a national best seller; and the older generation, it appears, is for the most part equally unenthusiastic. The

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personal polls taken by members of the Congress have uncovered this fact—which does great credit to the American people, both for common sense and for the ethical qualms which afflict a good many of them.

For this saner mood the members of Congress, and all citizens, owe a great debt to the Buddhists of South Vietnam. The Buddhist pressure on Ky and his military junta has once again demonstrated the political instability and unpopularity of the government, and thus stimulated sober second thoughts among even those citizens who were demanding victory, cost what it may. It also furnished a rational basis for Congressional reappraisal. A third beneficial effect was to show Washington that our embassy in Saigon is suffering from acute battle fatigue and that reports from that quarter should be received with the utmost skepticism. A conspicuous instance is the official fear and loathing focused on Thich Tri Quang, who was pictured as a devil in saffron robes. When he turned out to be as much opposed to the Vietcong as to the Americans, Ambassador Lodge and his assistants could hardly believe their ears.

The chances of a neutralist regime in South Vietnam within a few months seem favorable; for the United States, an invitation to depart would be a godsend. Whether the government army will resume fighting in full strength in the meantime remains to be seen. Right now, President Johnson is on the spot. Since the ill-advised meeting in Honolulu he has said little; since the anti-government and anti-American demonstrations broke out in Hue, Danang and Saigon he has said nothing at all. Silence may be golden for some, but the President of the United States is not so favorably situated. He got the country onto the Vietnamese escalator, and it is high time that he told us how he proposes to get us—and himself—off of it.

The Poor Are Human

The heckling that Sargent Shriver received at the Washington, D.C., meeting of Citizens Crusade against Poverty lends special significance to the article by Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven in this issue (p. 510). With a few exceptions, the reporters present treated the incident as an exhibition of irresponsible rage. Shriver himself, who should have known better, said that "people involved in the yelling business" had decided to disrupt the meeting "as an end in itself." Some few of the hecklers may have acted by prearrangement, but that was a great deal less than the whole truth. Most of the protesters were incontestably sincere; the Washington *Star* noted that some had tears in their eyes. Hoodlums have never been known to weep while engaged in their diversions.

Citizens Crusade against Poverty was set up with UAW backing, and under Walter Reuther's impetus, about a year ago. It is essentially a coalition of elitist groups—representatives of labor, churches, academicians, private philanthropy, et al. The gathering was in effect an annual membership meeting, with certain representatives of the poor invited as guests, and without voting rights. Some of these felt they were there as exhibits—window dressing—and the discussion that developed seemed so remote from their actual situation, and their need for understanding and remedial action, that tension rose and finally reached the flash point. Shriver himself contributed to the explosion by reeling off a lot of statistics in a typical public relations performance designed to make everyone happy; but this sort of thing, sure-fire with a Congressional committee or a civic group that wants to believe, does not work with the real ghetto poor.

At least two morals may be drawn. Citizens Crusade, as a broad coalition and a group drawn from the prosperous, cannot speak for and lead the poor. Second, for all its excellent intentions and sponsorship (and it is capable of some fine performances in fund raising and the like) it does not have a program and a strategy to deal with today's festering poverty—any more than OEO has such a program or strategy.

What is needed is exactly what Cloward and Piven offer: *a strategy for action.* They demonstrate how, within the context of a legal struggle for rights granted so far only in theory, a movement can be projected which would appeal directly to the urban poor. The immediate gains and benefits which such a program would provide, if fully realized, could lead to the guaranteed income which was first developed in these pages by Robert Theobald three years ago, and which has appeared in several variants (some dubious) since that time. Next week Theobald will outline what has happened to the idea of guaranteed income since he first propounded it. If his presentation receives serious attention, such clashes as the one that disturbed Shriver and the members of CCAP may be avoided in the future.

The Passport Decision

United States District Judge Joseph C. Zavatt, of Brooklyn, has ruled that the three young men who organized a student delegation to visit Cuba did not violate the statute which makes it a crime to depart from and enter the United States without a valid passport when a state of national emergency has been declared. Judge Zavatt decided that since the three held valid passports when they left and when they returned, they could not be prosecuted under this statute even though they had traveled to one of the areas which the State Department has designated as "forbidden." This was the first attempt by the government to invoke the particular statute in support of its misguided efforts to restrict the right of American citizens to travel.

Through a variety of informal devices, the State Department has been attempting to restrict the right without proper Congressional authorization. The results have not been particularly impressive. Between 1952 and 1963, about 600 American citizens have visited restricted areas without being prosecuted on their return; in each case the traveler held a valid passport which had not been validated for the forbidden zone. These figures, coupled with Judge Zavatt's decision, should, but probably will not, persuade the State Department to give up activities never delegated to it by Congress. At present, the Department pursues a policy of refusing to reissue passports to those who have traveled to "forbidden areas" unless the passport holder agrees not to travel in the future to any area which the Department has marked off bounds. Since this condition also lacks Congressional sanction, it too should be abandoned. Credit for

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this latest victory in the interminable struggle to maintain the right to travel free of needless and obnoxious conditions goes to Leonard Boudin of the New York Bar, and to the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

Out of Limbo

The two American soldiers who were held as prisoners by the Vietcong for two years and then released on the day of the protest march in Washington (see "Two GIs in Limbo" by Harry W. Ernst, *The Nation,* March 14) have been cleared by the U.S. Army of charges of aiding the enemy. The tour of duty of both soldiers, S/S George E. Smith and S/S Claude McClure, had expired while they were still prisoners of the Vietcong. For four months after their release, the Army held both men in custody while it pressed a meticulous investigation of the facts. In discharging them now, Army spokesmen say that the investigation failed to turn up "sufficient evidence to prove a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." It is a good omen that the Department of Defense has acted with proper respect for due process in the cases of Messrs. Smith and McClure and in the recent release from confinement of Lieut. Henry H. Howe (see *The Nation,* April 11, p.413).

No Target

Observers of our contemporary theatre frequently note the lack of satirical bite in topical entertainments. The charge is largely true, but there are problems. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 20, Secretary of Defense McNamara:

(1) Described the recent internal upheavals in South Vietnam as "political growing pains" of a "developing" country;

(2) "Strongly resented" the implication that the war in Vietnam is "in any sense" a civil war;

(3) Described as "baloney" the rumor that we might be running short of bombs to drop in Vietnam, and

(4) Declared that "we should be proud of what we are doing out there for the people of South Vietnam."

There is nothing that the coffeehouse lampoonists can do to a man who is willing to do that to himself. McNamara has, you might say, earned his immunity.

Sense in Civil Defense

As originally conceived, the civil defense program exhibited all the bad features of American life and none of the good. It is characteristic of this country that whenever an actual or apparent need appears, it becomes a Golconda for would-be job holders, big and small. In the case of civil defense, the cushy jobs were largely pre-empted by retired army officers who, what with their pensions and CD salaries, lived well and also enjoyed some of their accustomed perquisites of command. In New York City one of the fringe benefits was occupancy of a large, ornate building (annual rental $155,000) in which the director had a splendid office suite with a private kitchen and bath and two balconies from which he could look down on the civilians who, but for him, would perish in the impending nuclear holocaust. Of course, he knew that most of them would perish anyway, but those on whom his building—or some other building—did not fall, and who were not fried by the infrared rays or given a lethal dose of gamma rays, could hope to survive on water and biscuits and crawl out of the CD shelters after a couple of weeks to build America anew.

Mayor John V. Lindsay had other ideas. He knew that Portland, Ore., had abandoned civil defense entirely, that it hung on in little but name in St. Louis and Cleveland, and was in disrepute everywhere. By state law, New York City must have an Office of Civil Defense, or equivalent. Perhaps it should have something of the sort for practical reasons—not so much to cope with a nuclear disaster but with any disaster. Accordingly, the Mayor appointed Timothy J. Cooney, who it happens has been a *Nation* contributor, to the office of interim director, which was just what Mr. Cooney wanted to be. He is now leaving the post and the sumptuous office, having arranged for distribution of most of the CD functions among other city agencies and retaining, out of 280 employees, a fifteen-man group in an Office of Civil Defense and Disaster Control as the staff of the Mayor's Emergency Control Board.

Except for its para-military character there was never any sound reason for separating the two units, and in Mr. Cooney's estimation the para-military aspect was never relevant. He therefore recommended a revamped program, to continue on a trial basis under the following conditions:

(1) Change the name to include disaster control, CD alone being an insufficient reason for the operation.

(2) Make CDDC an integral part of all local disaster planning and coordination.

(3) Assign operation and functions to front-line city agencies.

(4) CDDC to be free from the delusions of grandeur which stemmed from the quasi-military basis of OCD.

(5) CDDC to maintain only a small headquarters staff of professionals in disaster control.

There is little doubt that the Mayor will accept Mr. Cooney's recommendations, incorporated in a 72-page report and covering such considerations as communications, police and fire auxiliaries, radiological monitoring and medical problems. In any case, Mr. Cooney has recommended himself out of a job. The citizens of the metropolis —great in its troubles as well as its triumphs—will be grateful to an officeholder so selfless and so summary.

Warren Miller

The Nation records with sorrow the death of Warren Miller, who since September of last year has been the magazine's literary editor. Although he was a member of the staff for only a tragically brief period, Mr. Miller's critical judgment, journalistic enterprise and novelist's appreciation of form and language made an impression on the magazine's literary department that readers were quick to appreciate. What they could not know was the pleasure of working with this witty and responsive man. To the wife, daughters and parents of Warren Miller the editors and staff of *The Nation* extend their most profound sympathy.

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THE WEIGHT OF THE POOR

A STRATEGY TO END POVERTY

RICHARD A. CLOWARD and FRANCES FOX PIVEN

Mr. Cloward is professor of social work, and Mrs. Piven is a research associate, both at the Columbia University School of Social Work.

How can the poor be organized to press for relief from poverty? How can a broad-based movement be developed and the current disarray of activist forces be halted? These questions confront, and confound, activists today. It is our purpose to advance a strategy which affords the basis for a convergence of civil rights organizations, militant anti-poverty groups and the poor. If this strategy were implemented, a political crisis would result that could lead to legislation for a guaranteed annual income and thus an end to poverty.

The strategy is based on the fact that a vast discrepancy exists between the benefits to which people are entitled under public welfare programs and the sums which they actually receive. This gulf is not recognized in a society that is wholly and self-righteously oriented toward getting people *off* the welfare rolls. It is widely known, for example, that nearly 8 million persons (half of them white) now subsist on welfare, but it is not generally known that for every person on the rolls at least one more probably meets existing criteria of eligibility but is not obtaining assistance.

The discrepancy is not an accident stemming from bureaucratic inefficiency; rather, it is an integral feature of the welfare system which, if challenged, would precipitate a profound financial and political crisis. The force for that challenge, and the strategy we propose, is a massive drive to recruit the poor *onto* the welfare rolls.

The distribution of public assistance has been a local and state responsibility, and that accounts in large part for the abysmal character of welfare practices. Despite the growing involvement of federal agencies in supervisory and reimbursement arrangements, state and local community forces are still decisive. The poor are most visible and proximate in the local community; antagonism toward them (and toward the agencies which are implicated with them) has always, therefore, been more intense locally than at the federal level. In recent years, local communities have increasingly felt class and ethnic friction generated by competition for neighborhoods, schools, jobs and political power. Public welfare systems are under the constant stress of conflict and opposition, made only sharper by the rising costs to localities of public aid. And, to accommodate this pressure, welfare practice everywhere has become more restrictive than welfare statute; much of the time it verges on lawlessness. Thus, public welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and their rolls low by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or to press claims, and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who are eligible.

A series of welfare drives in large cities would, we believe, impel action on a new federal program to distribute income, eliminating the present public welfare system and alleviating the abject poverty which it perpetrates. Widespread campaigns to register the eligible poor for welfare aid, and to help existing recipients obtain their full benefits, would produce bureaucratic disruption in welfare agencies and fiscal disruption in local and state governments. These disruptions would generate severe political strains, and deepen existing divisions among elements in the big-city Democratic coalition: the remaining white middle class, the white working-class ethnic groups and the growing minority poor. To avoid a further weakening of that historic coalition, a national Democratic administration would be constrained to advance a federal solution to poverty that would override local welfare failures, local class and racial conflicts and local revenue dilemmas. By the internal disruption of local bureaucratic practices, by the furor over public welfare poverty, and by the collapse of current financing arrangements, powerful forces can be generated for major economic reforms at the national level.

The ultimate objective of this strategy—to wipe out poverty by establishing a guaranteed annual income—will be questioned by some. Because the ideal of individual social and economic mobility has deep roots, even activists seem reluctant to call for national programs to eliminate poverty by the outright redistribution of income. Instead, programs are demanded to enable people to become economically competitive. But such programs are of no use to millions of today's poor. For example, one-third of the 35 million poor Americans are in families headed by females; these heads of family cannot be aided appreciably by job retraining, higher minimum wages, accelerated rates of economic growth, or employment in public works projects. Nor can the 5 million aged who are poor, nor those whose poverty results from the ill health of the wage earner. Programs to enhance individual mobility will chiefly benefit the very young, if not the as yet unborn. Individual mobility is no answer to the question of how to abolish the massive problem of poverty now.

It has never been the full answer. If many people in the past have found their way up from poverty by the path of individual mobility, many others have taken a different route. Organized labor stands out as a major example. Although many American workers never yielded their dreams of individual achievement, they accepted and practiced the principle that each can benefit only as the status of workers as a whole is elevated. They bargained for collective mobility, not for individual mobility; to promote their fortunes in the aggregate, not to promote the prospects of one worker over another. And if each finally found himself in the same relative economic relationship to his fellows as when he began, it was nevertheless clear that all were infinitely better off. That fact has sustained the labor movement in the face of a counter pull from the ideal of individual achievement.

But many of the contemporary poor will not rise from

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poverty by organizing to bargain collectively. They either are not in the labor force or are in such marginal and dispersed occupations (e.g., domestic servants) that it is extremely difficult to organize them. Compared with other groups, then, many of today's poor cannot secure a redistribution of income by organizing within the institution of private enterprise. A federal program of income redistribution has become necessary to elevate the poor en masse from poverty.

Several ways have been proposed for redistributing income through the federal government. It is not our purpose here to assess the relative merits of these plans, which are still undergoing debate and clarification. Whatever mechanism is eventually adopted, however, it must include certain features if it is not merely to perpetuate in a new guise the present evils of the public welfare system.

First, adequate levels of income must be assured. (Public welfare levels are astonishingly low; indeed, states typically define a "minimum" standard of living and then grant only a percentage of it, so that families are held well below what the government itself officially defines as the poverty level.) Furthermore, income should be distributed without requiring that recipients first divest themselves of their assets, as public welfare now does, thereby pauperizing families as a condition of sustenance.

Second, the right to income must be guaranteed, or the oppression of the welfare poor will not be eliminated. Because benefits are conditional under the present public welfare system, submission to arbitrary governmental power is regularly made the price of sustenance. People have been coerced into attending literacy classes or participating in medical or vocational rehabilitation regimes, on pain of having their benefits terminated. Men are forced into labor on virtually any terms lest they forfeit their welfare aid. One can prize literacy, health and work, while still vigorously opposing the right of government to compel compliance with these values.

Conditional benefits thus result in violations of civil liberties throughout the nation, and in a pervasive oppression of the poor. And these violations are not less real because the impulse leading to them is altruistic and the agency is professional. If new systems of income distribution continue to permit the professional bureaucracies to choose when to give and when to withhold financial relief, the poor will once again be surrendered to an arrangement in which their rights are diminished in the name of overcoming their vices. Those who lead an attack on the welfare system must therefore be alert to the pitfalls of inadequate but placating reforms which give the appearance of victory to what is in truth defeat.

How much economic force can be mobilized by this strategy? This question is not easy to answer because few studies have been conducted of people who are *not* receiving public assistance even though they may be eligible. For the purposes of this presentation, a few facts about New York City may be suggestive. Since practices elsewhere are generally acknowledged to be even more restrictive, the estimates of unused benefits which follow probably yield a conservative estimate of the potential force of the strategy set forth in this article.

Basic assistance for food and rent: The most striking characteristic of public welfare practice is that a great many people who appear to be eligible for assistance are not on the welfare rolls. The average monthly total of New York City residents receiving assistance in 1959 was 325,771, but according to the 1960 census, 716,000 persons (unrelated or in families) appeared to be subsisting on incomes at or below the prevailing welfare eligibility levels (e.g., $2,070 for a family of four). In that same year, 539,000 people subsisted on incomes *less than 80 per cent* of the welfare minimums, and 200,000 lived alone or in families on incomes reported to be *less than half* of eligibility levels. Thus it appears that for every person on welfare in 1959, at least one more was eligible.

The results of two surveys of selected areas in Manhattan support the contention that many people subsist on incomes below welfare eligibility levels. One of these, conducted by Greenleigh Associates in 1964 in an urban-renewal area on New York's upper West Side, found 9 per cent of those *not* on the rolls were in such acute need that they appeared to qualify for *emergency* assistance. The study showed, further, that a substantial number of families that were not in a "critical" condition would probably have qualified for supplemental assistance.

The other survey, conducted in 1961 by Mobilization for Youth, had similar findings. The area from which its sample was drawn, 67 square blocks on the lower East Side, is a poor one, but by no means the poorest in New York City. Yet 13 per cent of the total sample who were not on the welfare rolls reported incomes falling below the prevailing welfare schedules for food and rent.

There is no reason to suppose that the discrepancy between those eligible for and those receiving assistance has narrowed much in the past few years. The welfare rolls have gone up, to be sure, but so have eligibility levels. Since the economic circumstances of impoverished groups in New York have not improved appreciably in the past few years, each such rise increases the number of people who are potentially eligible for some degree of assistance.

Even if one allows for the possibility that family-income figures are grossly underestimated by the census, the financial implications of the proposed strategy are still very great. In 1965, the monthly average of persons receiving cash assistance in New York was 490,000, at a total cost of $440 million; the rolls have now risen above 500,000, so that costs will exceed $500 million in 1966. An increase in the rolls of a mere 20 per cent would cost an already overburdened municipality some $100 million.

Special grants: Public assistance recipients in New York are also entitled to receive "nonrecurring" grants for clothing, household equipment and furniture—including washing machines, refrigerators, beds and bedding, tables and chairs. It hardly needs to be noted that most impoverished families have grossly inadequate clothing and household furnishings. The Greenleigh study, for example, found that 52 per cent of the families on public assistance lacked anything approaching adequate furniture. This condition results because almost nothing is spent on special grants in New York. In October, 1965, a typical month, the Department of Welfare spent only $2.50 per recipient for heavy clothing and $1.30 for household furnishings. Taken together, grants of this

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kind amounted in 1965 to a mere $40 per person, or a total of $20 million for the entire year. Considering the real needs of families, the successful demand for full entitlements could multiply these expenditures tenfold or more—and that would involve the disbursement of many millions of dollars indeed.

One must be cautious in making generalizations about the prospects for this strategy in any jurisdiction unless the structure of welfare practices has been examined in some detail. We can, however, cite other studies conducted in other places to show that New York practices are not atypical. In Detroit, for example, Greenleigh Associates studied a large sample of households in a low-income district in 1965. Twenty per cent were already receiving assistance, but 35 per cent more were judged to need it. Although the authors made no strict determination of the eligibility of these families under the laws of Michigan, they believed that "larger numbers of persons were eligible than receiving." A good many of these families did not know that public assistance was available; others thought they would be deemed ineligible; not a few were ashamed or afraid to ask.

Similar deprivations have been shown in nation-wide studies. In 1963, the federal government carried out a survey based on a national sample of 5,500 families whose benefits under Aid to Dependent Children had been terminated. Thirty-four per cent of these cases were *officially in need of income at the point of closing*: this was true of 30 per cent of the white and 44 per cent of the Negro cases. The chief basis for termination given in local department records was "other reasons" (i.e., other than improvement in financial condition, which would make dependence on welfare unnecessary). Upon closer examination, these "other reasons" turned out to be "unsuitable home" (i.e., the presence of illegitimate children), "failure to comply with departmental regulations" or "refusal to take legal action against a putative father." (Negroes were especially singled out for punitive action on the ground that children were not being maintained in "suitable homes.") The amounts of money that people are deprived of by these injustices are very great.

In order to generate a crisis, the poor must obtain benefits which they have forfeited. Until now, they have been inhibited from asserting claims by self-protective devices within the welfare system: its capacity to limit information, to intimidate applicants, to demoralize recipients, and arbitrarily to deny lawful claims.

Ignorance of welfare rights can be attacked through a massive educational campaign. Brochures describing benefits in simple, clear language, and urging people to seek their full entitlements, should be distributed door to door in tenements and public housing projects, and deposited in stores, schools, churches and civic centers. Advertisements should be placed in newspapers; spot announcements should be made on radio. Leaders of social, religious, fraternal and political groups in the slums should also be enlisted to recruit the eligible to the rolls. The fact that the campaign is intended to inform people of their legal rights under a government program, that it is a civic education drive, will lend it legitimacy.

But information alone will not suffice. Organizers will have to become advocates in order to deal effectively with improper rejections and terminations. The advocate's task is to appraise the circumstances of each case, to argue its merits before welfare, to threaten legal action if satisfaction is not given. In some cases, it will be necessary to contest decisions by requesting a "fair hearing" before the appropriate state supervisory agency; it may occasionally be necessary to sue for redress in the courts. Hearings and court actions will require lawyers, many of whom, in cities like New York, can be recruited on a voluntary basis, especially under the banner of a movement to end poverty by a strategy of asserting legal rights. However, most cases will not require an expert knowledge of law, but only of welfare regulations; the rules can be learned by laymen, including welfare recipients themselves (who can help to man "information and advocacy" centers). To aid workers in these centers, handbooks should be prepared describing welfare rights and the tactics to employ in claiming them.

Advocacy must be supplemented by organized demonstrations to create a climate of militancy that will overcome the invidious and immobilizing attitudes which many potential recipients hold toward being "on welfare." In such a climate, many more poor people are likely to become their own advocates and will not need to rely on aid from organizers.

As the crisis develops, it will be important to use the mass media to inform the broader liberal community about the inefficiencies and injustices of welfare. For example, the system will not be able to process many new applicants because of cumbersome and often unconstitutional investigatory procedures (which cost 20c for every dollar disbursed). As delays mount, so should the public demand that a simplified affidavit supplant these procedures, so that the poor may certify to their condition. If the system reacts by making the proof of eligibility more difficult, the demand should be made that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare dispatch "eligibility registrars" to enforce federal statutes governing local programs. And throughout the crisis, the mass media should be used to advance arguments for a new federal income distribution program.*

Although new resources in organizers and funds would have to be developed to mount this campaign, a variety of conventional agencies in the large cities could also be drawn upon for help. The idea of "welfare rights" has begun to attract attention in many liberal circles. A number of organizations, partly under the aegis of the "war against poverty," are developing information and advocacy services for low-income people [see "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State" by Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, *The Nation*, issues of February 28 and March 7]. It is not likely that these organizations will directly participate in the present strategy, for obvious political reasons. But whether they participate or not, they constitute a growing network of resources to which people can be referred for help in

*In public statements, it would be important to distinguish between the income distributing function of public welfare, which should be replaced by new federal measures, and many other welfare functions, such as foster care and adoption services for children, which are not at issue in this strategy.

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establishing and maintaining entitlements. In the final analysis, it does not matter who helps people to get on the rolls or to get additional entitlements, so long as the job is done.

Since this plan deals with problems of great immediacy in the lives of the poor, it should motivate some of them to involve themselves in regular organizational activities. Welfare recipients, chiefly ADC mothers, are already forming federations, committees and councils in cities across the nation; in Boston, New York, Newark, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles, to mention a few. Such groups typically focus on obtaining full entitlements for existing recipients rather than on recruiting new recipients, and they do not yet comprise a national movement. But their very existence attests to a growing readiness among ghetto residents to act against public welfare.

To generate an expressly political movement, cadres of aggressive organizers would have to come from the civil rights movement and the churches, from militant low-income organizations like those formed by the Industrial Areas Foundation (that is, by Saul Alinsky), and from other groups on the Left. These activists should be quick to see the difference between programs to redress individual grievances and a large-scale social-action campaign for national policy reform.

Movements that depend on involving masses of poor people have generally failed in America. Why would the proposed strategy to engage the poor succeed?

First, this plan promises immediate economic benefits. This is a point of some importance because, whereas America's poor have not been moved in any number by radical political ideologies, they have sometimes been moved by their economic interests. Since radical movements in America have rarely been able to provide visible economic incentives, they have usually failed to secure mass participation of any kind. The conservative "business unionism" of organized labor is explained by this fact, for membership enlarged only as unionism paid off in material benefits. Union leaders have understood that their strength derives almost entirely from their capacity to provide economic rewards to members. Although leaders have increasingly acted in political spheres, their influence has been directed chiefly to matters of governmental policy affecting the well-



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being of organized workers. The same point is made by the experience of rent strikes in Northern cities. Their organizers were often motivated by radical ideologies, but tenants have been attracted by the promise that housing improvements would quickly be made if they withheld their rent.

Second, for this strategy to succeed, one need not ask more of most of the poor than that they claim lawful benefits. Thus the plan has the extraordinary capability of yielding mass influence *without* mass participation, at least as the term "participation" is ordinarily understood. Mass influence in this case stems from the consumption of benefits and does not require that large groups of people be involved in regular organizational roles.

Moreover, this kind of mass influence is cumulative because benefits are continuous. Once eligibility for basic food and rent grants is established, the drain on local resources persists indefinitely. Other movements have failed precisely because they could not produce continuous and cumulative influence. In the Northern rent strikes, for example, tenant participation depended largely on immediate grievances; as soon as landlords made the most minimal repairs, participation fell away and with it the impact of the movement. Efforts to revive tenant participation by organizing demonstrations around broader housing issues (e.g., the expansion of public housing) did not succeed because the incentives were not immediate.

Third, the prospects for mass influence are enhanced because this plan provides a practical basis for coalition between poor whites and poor Negroes. Advocates of low-income movements have not been able to suggest how poor whites and poor Negroes can be united in an expressly lower-class movement. Despite pleas of some Negro leaders for joint action on programs requiring integration, poor whites have steadfastly resisted making common cause with poor Negroes. By contrast, the benefits of the present plan are as great for whites as for Negroes. In the big cities, at least, it does not seem likely that poor whites, whatever their prejudices against either Negroes or public welfare, will refuse to participate when Negroes aggressively claim benefits that are unlawfully denied to them as well. One salutary consequence of public information campaigns to acquaint Negroes with their rights is that many whites will be made aware of theirs. Even if whites prefer to work through their own organizations and leaders, the consequences will be equivalent to joining with Negroes. For if the object is to focus attention on the need for new economic measures by producing a crisis over the dole, anyone who insists upon extracting maximum benefits from public welfare is in effect part of a coalition and is contributing to the cause.

The ultimate aim of this strategy is a new program for direct income distribution. What reason is there to expect that the federal government will enact such legislation in response to a crisis in the welfare system?

We ordinarily think of major legislation as taking form only through established electoral processes. We tend to overlook the force of crisis in precipitating legislative reform, partly because we lack a theoretical framework by which to understand the impact of major disruptions.

By crisis, we mean a *publicly visible* disruption in some institutional sphere. Crisis can occur spontaneously (e.g., riots) or as the intended result of tactics of demonstration and protest which either generate institutional disruption or bring unrecognized disruption to public attention. Public trouble is a political liability; it calls for action by political leaders to stabilize the situation. Because crisis usually creates or exposes conflict, it threatens to produce cleavages in a political consensus which politicians will ordinarily act to avert.

Although crisis impels political action, it does not itself determine the selection of specific solutions. Political leaders will try to respond with proposals which work to their advantage in the electoral process. Unless group cleavages form around issues and demands, the politician has great latitude and tends to proffer only the minimum action required to quell disturbances without risking existing electoral support. Spontaneous disruptions, such as riots, rarely produce leaders who articulate demands; thus no terms are imposed, and political leaders are permitted to respond in ways that merely restore a semblance of stability without offending other groups in a coalition.

When, however, a crisis is defined by its participants—or by other activated groups—as a matter of clear issues and preferred solutions, terms are imposed on the politicians' bid for their support. Whether political leaders then design solutions to reflect these terms depends on a twofold calculation: first, the impact of the crisis and the issues it raises on existing alignments and, second, the gains or losses in support to be expected as a result of a proposed resolution.

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As to the impact on existing alignments, issues exposed by a crisis may activate new groups, thus altering the balance of support and opposition on the issues; or it may polarize group sentiments, altering the terms which must be offered to insure the support of given constituent groups. In framing resolutions, politicians are more responsive to group shifts and are more likely to accommodate to the terms imposed when electoral coalitions threatened by crisis are already uncertain or weakening. In other words, the politician responds to group demands, not only by calculating the magnitude of electoral gains and losses, but by assessing the impact of the resolution on the stability of existing or potential coalitions. Political leaders are especially responsive to group shifts when the terms of settlement can be framed so as to shore up an existing coalition, or as a basis for the development of new and more stable alignments, *without* jeopardizing existing support. Then, indeed, the calculation of net gain is most secure.

The legislative reforms of the depression years, for example, were impelled not so much by organized interests exercised through regular electoral processes as by widespread economic crisis. That crisis precipitated the disrup-

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

tion of the regionally based coalitions underlying the old national parties. During the realignments of 1932, a new Democratic coalition was formed, based heavily on urban working-class groups. Once in power, the national Democratic leadership proposed and implemented the economic reforms of the New Deal. Although these measures were a response to the imperative of economic crisis, the types of measures enacted were designed to secure and stabilize the new Democratic coalition.

The civil rights movement, to take a recent case, also reveals the relationship of crisis and electoral conditions in producing legislative reform. The crisis in the South took place in the context of a weakening North-South Democratic coalition. The strains in that coalition were first evident in the Dixiecrat desertion of 1948, and continued through the Eisenhower years as the Republicans gained ground in the Southern states. Democratic party leaders at first tried to hold the dissident South by warding off the demands of enlarging Negro constituencies in Northern cities. Thus for two decades the national Democratic Party campaigned on strongly worded civil rights planks but enacted only token measures. The civil rights movement forced the Democrats' hand: a crumbling Southern partnership was forfeited, and major civil rights legislation was put forward, designed to insure the support of Northern Negroes and liberal elements in the Democratic coalition. That coalition emerged strong from the 1964 election, easily able to overcome the loss of Southern states to Goldwater. At the same time, the enacted legislation, particularly the Voting Rights Act, laid the ground for a new Southern Democratic coalition of moderate whites and the hitherto untapped reservoir of Southern Negro voters.

The electoral context which made crisis effective in the South is also to be found in the big cities of the nation today. Deep tensions have developed among groups comprising the political coalitions of the large cities—the historic stronghold of the Democratic Party. As a consequence, urban politicians no longer turn in the vote to national Democratic candidates with unfailing regularity. The marked defections revealed in the elections of the 1950s and which continued until the Johnson landslide of 1964 are a matter of great concern to the national party. Precisely because of this concern, a strategy to exacerbate still further the strains in the urban coalition can be expected to evoke a response from national leaders.

The weakening of the urban coalition is a result of many basic changes in the relationship of local party leadership to its constituents. First, the political machine, the distinctive and traditional mechanism for forging alliances among competing groups in the city, is now virtually defunct in most cities. Successive waves of municipal reform have deprived political leaders of control over the public resources—jobs, contracts, services and favors—which machine politicians formerly dispensed to voters in return for electoral support. Conflicts among elements in the urban Democratic coalition, once held together politically because each secured a share of these benefits, cannot now be so readily contained. And as the means of placating competing groups have diminished, tensions along ethnic and class lines have multiplied. These tensions are being intensified by the encroachments of an enlarging ghetto population on jobs, schools and residential areas. Big-city mayors are thus caught between antagonistic working-class ethnic

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groups, the remaining middle class, and the rapidly enlarging minority poor.

Second, there are discontinuities in the relationship between the urban party apparatus and its ghetto constituents which have so far remained unexposed but which a welfare crisis would force into view. The ghetto vote has been growing rapidly and has so far returned overwhelming Democratic majorities. Nevertheless, this voting bloc is not fully integrated in the party apparatus, either through the representation of its leaders or the accommodation of its interests.

While the urban political apparatus includes members of new minority groups, these groups are by no means represented according to their increasing proportions in the population. More important, elected representation alone is not an adequate mechanism for the expression of group interests. Influence in urban politics is won not only at the polls but through the sustained activity of organized interests—such as labor unions, home-owner associations and business groups. These groups keep watch over the complex operations of municipal agencies, recognizing issues and regularly asserting their point of view through meetings with public officials, appearances at public hearings and the like, and by exploiting a whole array of channels of influence on government. Minority constituencies—at least the large proportion of them that are poor—are not regular participants in the various institutional spheres where organized interest groups typically develop. Thus the interests of the mass of minority poor are not protected by associations which make their own or other political leaders responsive by continuously calling them to account. Urban party organizations have become, in consequence, more an avenue for the personal advancement of minority political leaders than a channel for the expression of minority-group interests. And the big-city mayors, struggling to preserve an uneasy urban consensus, have thus been granted the slack to evade the conflict-generating interests of the ghetto. A crisis in public welfare would expose the tensions latent in this attenuated relationship between the ghetto vote and the urban party leadership, for it would thrust forward ghetto demands and back them with the threat of defections by voters who have so far remained both loyal and quiescent.

In the face of such a crisis, urban political leaders may well be paralyzed by a party apparatus which ties them to older constituent groups, even while the ranks of these groups are diminishing. The national Democratic leadership, however, is alert to the importance of the urban Negro vote, especially in national contests where the loyalty of other urban groups is weakening. Indeed, many of the legislative reforms of the Great Society can be understood as efforts, however feeble, to reinforce the allegiance of growing ghetto constituencies to the national Democratic Administration. In the thirties, Democrats began to put forward measures to circumvent the states in order to reach the big-city elements in the New Deal coalition; now it is becoming expedient to put forward measures to circumvent the weakened big-city mayors in order to reach the new minority poor.

Recent federal reforms have been impelled in part by widespread unrest in the ghetto, and instances of more aggressive Negro demands. But despite these signs that the ghetto vote may become less reliable in the future, there has been as yet no serious threat of massive defection. The national party has therefore not put much pressure on its urban branches to accommodate the minority poor. The resulting reforms have consequently been quite modest (e.g., the war against poverty, with its emphasis on the "involvement of the poor," is an effort to make the urban party apparatus somewhat more accommodating).

A welfare crisis would, of course, produce dramatic local political crisis, disrupting and exposing rifts among urban groups. Conservative Republicans are always ready to declaim the evils of public welfare, and they would probably be the first to raise a hue and cry. But deeper and politically more telling conflicts would take place within the Democratic coalition. Whites—both working-class ethnic groups and many in the middle class—would be aroused against the ghetto poor, while liberal groups, which until recently have been comforted by the notion that the poor are few and, in any event, receiving the beneficent assistance of public welfare, would probably support the movement. Group conflict, spelling political crisis for the local party apparatus, would thus become acute as welfare rolls mounted and the strains on local budgets became more severe. In New York City, where the Mayor is now facing desperate revenue shortages, welfare expenditures are already second only to those for public education.

It should also be noted that welfare costs are generally shared by local, state and federal governments, so that the crisis in the cities would intensify the struggle over revenues that is chronic in relations between cities and states. If the past is any predictor of the future, cities will fail to procure relief from this crisis by persuading states to increase their proportionate share of urban welfare costs, for state legislatures have been notoriously unsympathetic to the revenue needs of the city (especially where public welfare and minority groups are concerned).

If this strategy for crisis would intensify group cleavages, a federal income solution would not further exacerbate them. The demands put forward during recent civil rights drives in the Northern cities aroused the opposition of huge majorities. Indeed, such fierce resistance was evoked (e.g., school boycotts followed by counter-boycotts), that accessions by political leaders would have provoked greater political turmoil than the protests themselves, for profound class and ethnic interests are at stake in the employment, educational and residential institutions of our society. By contrast, legislative measures to provide direct income to the poor would permit national Democratic leaders to cultivate ghetto constituencies without unduly antagonizing other urban groups, as is the case when the battle lines are drawn over schools, housing or jobs. Furthermore, a federal income program would not only redeem local governments from the immediate crisis but would permanently relieve them of the financially and politically onerous burdens of public welfare*—a function which generates support from

*It should also be noted that the federal government, unlike local jurisdictions, has taxing powers which yield substantially increased revenues as an automatic by-product of increases in national income.

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none and hostility from many, not least of all welfare recipients.

We suggest, in short, that if pervasive institutional reforms are not yet possible, requiring as they do expanded Negro political power and the development of new political alliances, crisis tactics can nevertheless be employed to secure particular reforms in the short run by exploiting weaknesses in current political alignments. Because the urban coalition stands weakened by group conflict today, disruption and threats of disaffection will count powerfully, provided that national leaders can respond with solutions which retain the support of ghetto constituencies while avoiding new group antagonisms and bolstering the urban party apparatus. These are the conditions, then, for an effective crisis strategy in the cities to secure an end to poverty.

No strategy, however confident its advocates may be, is foolproof. But if unforeseen contingencies thwart this plan to bring about new federal legislation in the field of poverty, it should also be noted that there would be gains even in defeat. For one thing, the plight of many poor people would be somewhat eased in the course of an assault upon public welfare. Existing recipients would come to know their rights and how to defend them, thus acquiring dignity where none now exists; and millions of dollars in withheld welfare benefits would become available to potential recipients now—not several generations from now. Such an attack should also be welcome to those currently concerned with programs designed to equip the young to rise out of poverty (e.g., Head Start), for surely children learn more readily when the oppressive burden of financial insecurity is lifted from the shoulders of their parents. And those seeking new ways to engage the Negro politically should remember that public resources have always been the fuel for low-income urban political organization. If organizers can deliver millions of dollars in cash benefits to the ghetto masses, it seems reasonable to expect that the masses will deliver their loyalties to their benefactors. At least, they have always done so in the past.

MOSCOW CONGRESS

The Old Party & the Young People

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

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At the 23rd Congress, which ended in Moscow on April 9, the Soviet ruling group put a tombstone on Mr. Khrushchev's political grave, without once mentioning his name. An almost identical method of anonymous denunciation, it may be recalled, was applied to Stalin in the first two or three years after his death. It is certain that at the closed session of this Congress, to which foreign Communists—delegates from "fraternal parties"—were not admitted, the de-Khrushchevization was carried out quite explicitly. But until news about what happened behind the closed doors leaks out, the results of the Congress can be assessed only on the basis of the incomplete official reports.

What is clear even now is that the Congress has brought about, or at least revealed, a swing from reform and de-Stalinization to more rigid and authoritarian policies which may be described, for the lack of a better term, as crypto- or neo-Stalinist. Most of the reforms initiated by Khrushchev have been scrapped. The Congress was extremely reticent about the previously much advertised advice of Soviet economists who urged the government to give wider scope to profit in the national economy. There is to be more central control over the administration and over industry. Stability, discipline and caution were the watchwords.

The desire for stability and the fear of taking risks were so great that the authoritarians did not even dare to boast of their indubitable success. They protested against the "wholesale denigration of our heroic past" by novelists and memoirists; they called for stricter party supervision over history writing, literature and the arts; but they did not come out openly as the defenders of Stalin and Stalinism. Evidently no one who aspires to play a role in Soviet political life can afford to do so. This accounts for the fact that the Congress did not rehabilitate Molotov and Kaganovich, the "Stalinist die-hards" whom Khrushchev had expelled from the party, but only their associate, the old Marshal Voroshilov.

In the weeks preceding the opening of the Congress, rumors of an impending rehabilitation of the great despot caused alarm and led many eminent scientists, writers and party veterans to express their misgivings in public demonstrations, in collective letters to the party leaders, and in various other ways. These were almost factional activities, such as had not been tolerated for forty years—because in the party, as in any army, collective protests of any kind are held tantamount to mutiny. Those presently guilty of the mutinous acts have been reproved, but most of them are far too eminent to be punished, and their warnings have been heeded, up to a point, even by the crypto-Stalinists who sensed that they might raise a storm if they behaved too provocatively.

Thus, the authoritarian trend in party affairs has shown itself less in open pronouncements than in furtive maneuvers and symbolic gestures. The party's supreme authority, the Presidium, has been renamed the Politburo, as it was in the old days; and Mr. Brezhnev is no longer First Secretary but General Secretary, as Stalin was. The leaders of the three most powerful organizations, those of

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Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine, came forward with the demand for the restitution of the old title which, they recalled, had been introduced by Lenin in 1922. This was no innocent playing with labels and historic memories, for although it is true that the Politburo and the office of the General Secretary had been formed on Lenin's initiative, it was only during the Stalin era that those offices acquired their characteristic awe-inspiring quality. To Russians old enough to remember, it was evident that the leaders of Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine were in fact calling for a "strong man" to take command of the party once again, and that they hoped to impart strength to him by giving him Stalin's title. Yet no sooner had they raised this call than they had to mute it ambiguously by reassuring the Congress that they wanted "strong leadership" of the Leninist rather than the Stalinist type.

The same ambiguity surrounded other decisions. Mr. Mikoyan, who had been the brain behind Khrushchev in the heyday of de-Stalinization, was not re-elected to the Politburo. Ostensibly that was because of old age and ill health, yet the party's ruling circle let him go in silence, without even a vote of thanks for his forty years of service in the Politburo (and the Presidium). The restriction which the previous Congress had placed on the re-election of members to high office for second, third or fourth terms was abolished. This reflected the hierarchy's fear that too much "fresh blood" might result in too radical a change in the character and identity of the ruling group. The Congress further resolved, again amid invocations of Leninist precedents, that so-called party conferences should be held in the intervals between party Congresses. Delegates to Congresses are elected by the rank and file, while participants of conferences are appointed from above. The difference may not be great in a country and a party where the rank and file usually elect only the nominees of those in authority. All the same, the conferences will more decidedly be the bureaucracy's own vehicles, immune from infiltration by undesirable influences; and the fact that they have been held may be an excuse to avoid convoking Congresses in critical situations. These measures and the all-around tightening of discipline indicate how anxious Mr. Brezhnev and his adherents are to reinforce the structure and moral authority of the party, which have been badly shaken by the upsets of the post-Stalin years.

This indeed is a time of trouble for the Soviet Union. The prospects in agriculture remain uncertain. The standard of living is not rising, or not rising fast enough. The economy has lost some of its momentum. Popular discontents have been boiling up. The ideological disarray, of which the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair is symptomatic, threatens to affect national morale. And the outlook is rendered the more unsettled by the tensions between various age groups. The old guilt-laden Stalinist generation is dying out, and the young who never knew Stalin are making their entry in every field of the national life. It should be remarked that 50 per cent of the Soviet population is under 26 years old; for these people the last war is not even a childhood memory and the taboos of the Stalin era are meaningless. Because of the immense Soviet losses in the last war—20 million dead!—the middle generation is too weak and battered to fill the gap left by the old and to hold its ground against the young.

The next five or ten years are going to bring a dramatic rejuvenation of Soviet life, something like an explosion of youth and an eruption of new age groups into national politics and public affairs. The party is physically and mentally much older than the nation. About 50 per cent of its members have passed 40, and the average age of the hierarchy is around 50.

A gap is thus yawning between the elderly, conservative and frightened ruling group and the young, vigorous but frustrated nation. Mr. Brezhnev is trying not so much to bridge the gap as to put up dams against the threatening upsurge of new and unknown forces. It is doubtful that the dams can hold, or that Mr. Brezhnev—even with the title of General Secretary—is the "strong man" capable of controlling the gathering storm. He may well be the party's new King Canute.

On foreign policy, the pronouncements of the 23rd Congress were cagey, for they were designed to conceal differences within the ruling group, and to avoid open controversy with other Communist parties. Almost nothing was said about the Russo-Chinese conflict, although shortly before the Congress Moscow assailed the Maoists heavily in confidential messages addressed to foreign Communists, and although the Chinese had pointedly refused to attend the Congress.

The delegates had to content themselves with Brezhnev's benign assurances of good will toward China and of confidence in a happy resolution of the conflict. Between the lines one could almost hear sighs of relief at the absence of the Chinese. At the previous Congress, Chou En-lai, the notorious troublemaker, walked out after Khrushchev had launched an attack on the Albanians. No such scandalous scene could occur this time. The Soviet leaders at the Congress showed a somewhat ostentatious "prudence and self-restraint" vis-à-vis China, and the tactic earned them handsome dividends. Some of the parties that had until recently lined up with the Maoists were represented at the Congress, and their delegates joined in the great hosanna for Khrushchev's successors. The Vietnamese (of North and South) have also come with thanksgivings for the aid they were receiving from Russia; and in faraway Havana, Fidel Castro was belaboring the Chinese with a rancor that even Khrushchev could not have matched. Brezhnev and Kosygin had some reason to be satisfied.

Yet, for all the prudence and caution, their speeches contained definite surprises; and so did the foreign policy deliberations. Brezhnev expressed himself in an idiom and in accents different from those used by Khrushchev. Although he spoke about Russia's desire to avoid war with the American imperialists, he did not dwell on "peaceful coexistence." The denunciations of American interventions in Vietnam and Latin America were unusually blunt; and, unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev drew no distinction between the "aggressive war mongers" and the "peace-loving and rational elements" in the American Administration. His leitmotiv was the Soviet Union's unconditional solidarity with all the revolutionary forces in the world struggling against neo-colonialism and striving for socialism.

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To be sure, Khrushchev used to express similar sentiments, and it may thus be argued that there was nothing new in what Brezhnev said. However, the novelty consisted in quite a sharp shift of emphasis. "Peaceful coexistence," which used to be Khrushchev's main theme, was only a minor note in Brezhnev's performance; and Khrushchev's secondary or even incidental theme—the Soviet Union's international revolutionary commitment—was Brezhnev's keynote. This was reflected in the whole composition and style of his exposé, which precluded any of those nostalgic references to the "spirit of Geneva" and "spirit of Camp David" which abounded in Khrushchevite pronouncements.

Nor did delegates at the Congress, including those from foreign Communist parties, speak about the possibility of a "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism" in some countries, which was another major theme in Khrushchev's time. These two notions—"peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition"—have been the objects of all the Maoist attacks, for they were, in Chinese eyes, the most important manifestations of "Khrushchevite revisionism." The present Soviet leaders were obviously anxious to remove these targets from sight. Thus, in a vague and cautious way, the Congress was staged as a demonstration of a return to orthodoxy and to militancy. Characteristic of this mood was the fact that even the music that was transmitted into the Congress hall from the Soviet satellite orbiting the moon was not the anthem of the Soviet Union, but the *Internationale*, the hymn of revolution and fighting communism. This stage effect was carefully chosen.

The war in Vietnam had undoubtedly cast its shadow on the Congress. A special resolution on Vietnam commits the Soviet Government to counter American escalation with increased aid to the Vietcong. The heightened vigilance and the stricter domestic discipline are all related to the tension in Southeast Asia. This recalls the days of the Korean War, about fifteen years ago, when Stalin was tightening the reins. But the alarms and the fears were much graver then, for the fighting was taking place much nearer the Soviet frontiers, and the threat of world war seemed imminent.

On the other hand, Brezhnev and Kosygin must cope with difficulties that did not trouble Stalin. They must face the accusation that they are not doing enough to help the Vietcong or to defend North Vietnam against American bombardment. Not only the Chinese say this; even such staunch anti-Maoists as the Poles are reproaching Moscow for its inactivity and *immobilisme*. (The Poles cannot help wondering, with a glance toward Germany, whether the Russians might not behave with similar phlegm in case of a conflict nearer home.)

Generally speaking, Soviet passivity in face of armed American attacks on a "fraternal Socialist country" is causing anxiety in all Communist parties. At the Congress, this mood was expressed by the Cuban delegate who, despite his party's breach with the Chinese, delivered a veiled but nevertheless scathing attack on the Soviet position. Quoting Castro, he called on the Soviet party and government to "take any risks that may be necessary to meet American aggression." He held out the example of his own country, so small and so precariously placed, which was not afraid of any risks; why then should the Soviet colossus behave



Jusp, Wir Bruckenbauer: Ben Roth

Dusting

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so gingerly over Vietnam? "Very soon," he warned, "there are going to be many other Vietnams" in various parts of the world, especially in Latin America.

The Cuban delegate, among others, was not impressed by Brezhnev's statement that Soviet aid to Vietnam last year amounted to half a billion dollars; it is very little indeed, compared with the American expenditure. And uneasiness over the Soviet Government's behavior is certainly shared by some sections of the Soviet people as well. This may be gathered from an event reported to have taken place just after the Congress, when in the very center of Moscow a young Ukrainian burned himself to death in protest against the authorities' refusal to let him go and fight as a volunteer in Vietnam. This demonstration was as unusual in Soviet circumstances as it is significant.

The resolutions of the Congress and the reticence of the leaders in the matter of China conceal at least two conflicting attitudes. On the one hand, there are those among the leaders who have in fact no desire for a reconciliation with China but who are determined to continue the feud to the "bitter end"; they hold that it is good tactics for them to go on refraining from public polemics, to counter criticisms with insubstantial verbal concessions, and so to place the odium of the breach on the Chinese. Others, however, are genuinely eager to come to terms with the Chinese, to coordinate policies and action, and to intervene more decisively in defense of North Vietnam. American "escalation" works to strengthen this latter group; and both groups fear that if the Russo-Chinese conflict is acted out in the open, the Americans may feel encouraged to attack China; and in that case the Soviet Union might find itself drawn into global conflict. It is difficult enough for the Soviet Government to stand aloof while the American Air Force is bombarding North Vietnam; but it would be quite impossible for it to do so if China were bombed. (There was also much talk at the Congress about the threat to European peace implied by the Washington-Bonn axis that was forming within NATO.) All this explains why Brezhnev and his adherents had to adopt at the Congress the posture of "moderation" toward China. Behind the scenes, however, they continue to attack the Chinese; and, indeed, conduct an unpublicized war of nerves against Maoism.

SANTO DOMINGO

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

SIDNEY LENS

Mr. Lens has just returned from a brief trip to Santo Domingo, which he previously visited in the summer of 1963. His Radicalism in America *will be published on May 27 by Thomas Y. Crowell Co.*

A peace of sorts has prevailed in Santo Domingo during the past few weeks, but there is some question both as to its durability and its significance. There is no doubt as to what brought it about. On February 9, palace guards, who had enough tear gas to restrain a small army, instead used their rifles against an unarmed demonstration of students; they killed four and wounded forty-three. Anger ran so high that when Juan Bosch and his friends called a general strike they effectively tied up the economy for eight days. The result was the long-overdue banishment of the reactionary Minister of the Armed Forces, Francisco Javier Rivera Caminero, and the appointment of a more moderate man, Gen. Enrique Perez y Perez, as Chief of Staff. The chief of police was also tossed out in favor of someone considered more tolerant of the constitutionalists who adhere to the cause of Juan Bosch. The new appointments, combined with the surprising vitality of the revolutionary forces during the strike, have convinced the terrorists that for the moment caution is wiser than excess.

Even so, the situation is still explosive. Members of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) are afraid that this may be the lull before the storm, and that when it becomes obvious that Washington's man on horseback, Joaquin Balaguer, has no chance of winning the June 1 Presidential election, terror will break out on an even greater scale. Adherents of the more radical Social Christians, in alliance with the PRD, share these forebodings.



Vadillo, La Prensa: Ben Roth

The signs of tension are thick. When Balaguer leaves his combined home and office on Maximo Gomez Avenue, a small red car, manned by three soldiers with submachine guns, precedes his limousine. In the house itself, a dozen or more armed men are stationed on the second floor when Balaguer holds court. A few blocks away, Rafael Bonnely, another former Trujillista who is also a Presidential candidate, has a smaller bodyguard, but it is clear that he too does not feel safe without a few gunmen around. As for the key man in this crisis, Juan Bosch, he is holed up in a small house not far from the Embajador Hotel, guarded assiduously by seventy "frogmen" who were the vanguard of the revolution of April 24, 1965. Of the four major political figures, only Antonio del Rosario of the Social Christians has no military guard—at least none is visible—at either his home or office.

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Everyone in Santo Domingo knows someone who has a hidden machine gun or submachine gun. The number of weapons in civilian hands is estimated at between 4,000 and 12,000—no small armory in a country whose combined police and military force is 25,000. Two young fellows talking to us on the street in the center of town unbuttoned their shirts to show their hidden pearl-handled pistols. Children 8 to 14 years of age, called "The Doves," are organized to steal small arms from Brazilians or Americans. Considerable amounts of hand grenades and ammunition, it is said, are being bought under the table from soldiers of the Inter-American Peace Force (FIP). Two months ago fifty-two members of the Dominican air force tried to stage a revolt when the thirty-four rightist military figures disobeyed the President's order to leave the country. Nine of them were sergeants, reflecting the strong division that still gnaws at the armed services themselves. Eight hundred to 900 of Col. Francisco Camaano's "rebels" are stationed in a special camp near town, and their political views are still said to be "constitutionalist." Wherever one turns, therefore, the ingredients are present for another explosion.

All of these factors suggest that the salient feature of Dominican life today is an *unfinished* revolution, one which the United States—with more sophistication than it showed last year—is still trying desperately to abort, but which the active Dominicans, especially the youth, are trying to conclude. American intervention, it is now clear, was not only harsh, brutal and crude, but momentarily miscalculated. From April 24 to April 28, 1965, there was genuine revolution in Santo Domingo—a real, democratic uprising of far-reaching significance. That revolution concentrated above everything else on destroying the military caste that had served Trujillo for thirty-one years, had overthrown the only democratically elected government in many decades, that of Juan Bosch, and had held the reins of power until April. The demand for the return of President Bosch was simply the obverse side of their hostility to militarist reaction.

To the young men who led that revolution it is the United States and the United States alone that saves the militarists from oblivion. "In two days," says a 25-year-old PRD member who commanded a squad near the Hotel Commercial, "we had those bums licked and we would have wiped them out in the next thirty-six hours if you North Americans hadn't sent in 27,000 of your soldiers." His words are confirmed by Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, who conceded that the army chiefs "were on the run," that "the navy, with the exception of nine of its more than thirty ships of all types, was almost totally on the other side. Indecision continued at air force headquarters. . . . The police force's chiefs were indecisive and vacillating."

American intervention, according to Juan Bosch, cost the Dominican people 4,000 lives. Wessin, at the Embassy's request, bombed the rebel sectors, and U.S. troops cut the constitutionalist forces in two, permitting the old guard to wreak havoc on "rebels" isolated in the northern part of town. Yet Washington had made a monumental miscalculation. "Strong" as its policy seemed to American hawks, the revolution did not melt away. The young men held their ground in the center of town and the United States seemed confronted with the choice of either leveling the center of the city or coming to some accommodation with the revolution.

It did neither. It retreated from naked force to what it considered sophisticated negotiations, but the core of its strategy—then as now—has been to save the military caste at all costs. In the following weeks a remarkable series of talks took place both in Washington and Santo Domingo—most of it still unpublicized. According to highly reliable sources here, Rosario, leader of the Social Christians, a group similar to that of President Frei in Chile, met with Jose ("Pepe") Figueres in Washington. Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, had had friendly relations with the White House ever since the Kennedy administration. He now acted as an intermediary in the Dominican affair.

President Johnson, Figueres told Rosario, recognizes that he has made a terrible blunder. He wants to correct it, but as you know, a great nation cannot retreat in these circumstances without some kind of face saver. Figueres suggested, tentatively, that perhaps the Dominicans could send thirty or forty Communists into exile. They could then set up a PRD government without Bosch (who had become a bone in Johnson's throat) and the Marines could be shipped back home.

Rosario made it clear that neither he nor the PRD believed that you could fight ideas with guns, yet in order to save his nation from the Marines he would appeal to the Communists to make the sacrifice. He was confident that he could get thirty or forty Communist leaders to leave the country voluntarily, provided they were given jobs in the diplomatic or other services. But he insisted that for every Communist sent out, a Trujillista military man must also go. Figueres twice took this proposal to the White House, and on the second occasion came back elated. "We have won," he cried. "Johnson is with us." Rosario too was happy; he telephoned the news to Col. Francisco Camaano's foreign minister.

But by the time McGeorge Bundy came to Santo Domingo to implement this understanding, it had been twisted beyond recognition. Instead of voluntary exile for the Communists he demanded that they be incarcerated in concentration camps. And instead of removing the Trujillista officers simultaneously, he agreed only to sending out the two most hated of them, Wessin and Rivera Caminero. As a crowning insult, he demanded that all the constitutionalist military leaders, from Colonel Camaano down, be ousted from the country. Such a proposal was, of course, unacceptable, and Bundy's mission failed. The American press reported that the two sides could not agree on someone to head a provisional government, but it did not note the other maneuvers, above all the betrayed understanding.

The next phase of American policy was the selection of Hector Garcia-Godoy as provisional President and the setting of June 1, 1966, as the date for national elections. Garcia-Godoy is a sincere man, on reasonably good terms with most factions, but he is—as some of his friends put it—"a born compromiser" and weak. Under his regime the ten constitutionalist military leaders have indeed been sent abroad—as Bundy had proposed—but of the rightists only Caminero and Wessin went into exile. The rest are still there; some have been shifted and a few demoted, but the

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

Vicky, London Evening Standard: Ben Roth

ancient military fabric is intact. From September 3, 1965, when Garcia-Godoy took office until March, 1966, members of this military force participated in a wave of individual assassinations that exacted a toll of one or two men a day. According to the Dominican Association for Human Rights, 200 to 250 "rebels" have been killed, and perhaps twice that number tortured and wounded. The association's file of affidavits on these atrocities is literally 14 inches high. The association charges that American troops have occasionally fired at people solely because they shouted "Yankee Go Home." Maj. Arias Collado, a constitutionalist, disappeared on the way to camp in territory patrolled by U.S. forces, and his body was later found in this zone. The governor of one province, a member of PRD, was ambushed in November and murdered.

In December, constitutionalist soldiers gathering at the Hotel Matum in Santiago to commemorate the death of one of their fellows, were attacked by five tanks and 400 soldiers of the air force. President Garcia-Godoy was informed within an hour and FIP troops were on the scene before 1 P.M. From 1 to 5:30 P.M., however, they did nothing to stop hostilities. If demonstrations had not broken out in Santo Domingo there might have been a massacre. As it was, three or four were killed inside the hotel and six outside, perhaps by execution.

Nor is this all. Harassment has been constant. In the hinterlands, homes of PRD and Social Christian members are shot at in the middle of the night to warn them against participating in political meetings. It is only rarely that the left of Center parties dare to hold a demonstration in the open, for fear there will be wholesale killings. On March 2, Rosario was addressing a small gathering in the home of a teacher when twelve military men, with submachine guns poised, invaded the premises and demanded to know "who granted permission for this affair." A few days later in downtown Santo Domingo, Rosario himself was hauled out of his automobile by six soldiers, made to put up his hands, and searched like a common criminal, even though his identity was well known. Constitutionalists are frequently stopped by police, searched, their voter identity cards taken and torn up.

It is against this background that the United States now hopes to vault Joaquin Balaguer, Trujillo's puppet president and "image maker," into the Presidency on June 1. Without the terror and harassment his prospects would be nil; with it he enjoys an outside chance, for the people are becoming tired and hoping for delivery from the pervasive uncertainty.

Short and emaciated, belying the healthy look of his posters, Balaguer has a way of making people forget he was Trujillo's boy, even while he uses some of Trujillo's methods. He is the son of immigrants who never enjoyed favor with the upper classes. Thousands remember the individual favors he did when he came to power after Trujillo's assassination: helping a cab driver to buy a taxi or a peasant to make a loan or a worker to get a job. In the driveway of his home today sixty or eighty people wait in line to dictate little memoranda to a young male typist, asking for some help. Balaguer tries during his hectic schedule to see as many of these petitioners as possible. He puts his arm around the shoulder of a hapless peasant and commiserates with him in a paternalistic style reminiscent of a William Dawson, a Tammany politician—or a Trujillo. He can be very reassuring, especially to those whose sons have been killed or who are at the end of their tether.

And according to the vice minister of labor, one-half of the working population — 500,000 out of 2 million — are without jobs. Some 600,000 Dominicans depend in whole or in part on food packages from CARE or the Catholic relief agency. In the heart of Santo Domingo, according to one doctor, you can find entire families living on one meal, 20c a day. The 4,000 killed, the continued kidnapings, the tortures, the harassment—all this intensifies the desire for stability.

In this atmosphere Balaguer's espousal of "peace" strikes a resonant chord. "Prepare for the arrival of peace in 1966," says a little card he has mailed to thousands of followers in the Reformist party. Balaguer—so far at least —does not waste time attacking Juan Bosch, or the candi-

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date to the right of him, Rafael Bonnely. Instead he talks platitudes: "I represent the party of the mother" who doesn't want her boy killed. And since it is obvious to everyone that he has the support both of the United States and the Dominican military, this sort of talk wins recruits in some quarters. It has not yet galvanized a majority. A newspaper man who attended Balaguer's meeting at Quisqueya reports there were few natives of that town in the audience of 300. There were some armed soldiers, some ex-soldiers, people brought in from elsewhere by truck, and even a few Haitians, but almost no one from the neighborhood.

One can only wonder, however, whether anyone in the State Department has tried to gauge the full consequences of any solution other than Juan Bosch, who declared his own candidacy on April 10. The young revolutionaries—what someone has called the "active population"—command the cities and a considerable sector in the villages. The slogans they have painted and the posters they have plastered in the center of Santo Domingo reflect wide popular acceptance: "Yankee Go Home," "Oust FAY" (Yankee Forces of Aggression). Just off El Conde Street near Independence Square, they have put up a grotesque poster of a big Yankee soldier holding a protesting citizen and encouraging an armed native soldier to go after him. Anti-Americanism, though not universal—it is weaker in the villages than in the cities—is nonetheless rampant. Under this heading, the young rebels include not only the Yankees themselves but the Dominican military leaders and Balaguer. Will they yield quietly to a Balaguer build-up, particularly if it comes on the heels of renewed terror? Or will they renew their revolution again in other forms—strikes, guerrilla actions?

Despite the momentary calm and the removal of the American troops to the suburbs, the gulf between the active populace and the United States and its allies widens. Hatred intensifies. Bosch points out that while there were only 700 Communists in 1963, there are now 12,000, and they are growing, particularly among university students. The leftist mood penetrates ever deeper, but neither the United States nor its Dominican friends know how to appease it. In the end, it may turn out that a greater bloodletting was only postponed. No one can guarantee that U.S. troops will leave even after the elections. "It depends," an assistant to Ellsworth Bunker says, "on what the new government wants." This is sufficiently vague to raise doubts.

Juan Bosch, looking more relaxed despite his ordeal than when I saw him two and a half years ago, and still exerting the personal magnetism that welds him to his people, poses the dilemma of all of Latin America. "You can't build democracy on this hemisphere *with* the United States," he says, "and you can't build it *without* the United States." You can't build it with the United States because Uncle Sam insists, as the cornerstone of its policy, on upholstering flabby military Fascists. And you can't build it without, because the U.S. represents the economic and political reality of this hemisphere. Without U.S. tolerance it is impossible to forge a viable society.

The Dominican people are caught on the horns of this dilemma, and it is doubtful that the June elections, even if they are held, will spring them loose.

LETTERS *(continued from page 506)*

may in fact include certain procedures for change. But it is precisely what is happening *now* that is being protested. And if the law, be it specific or the whole legal structure, condones these happenings, or inhibits effective (communicative) protest, then it, too, is being challenged.

The fact that a violation of a trespass law is the crime in question is not insignificant, though at first it may so appear, for such statutes were clearly initiated to protect one's private property, and peaceful demonstrations at any public site do not, to my way of thinking, necessarily constitute such a violation. . . . No one's living room has been invaded nor has anyone's lawn been trampled. Rather, interested and concerned citizens have taken a stand at the local seat of an offending government agency. . . . If it is difficult for the law to appreciate this distinction, so much the worse for the law.

It is not clear, though, that the law need find this a difficulty. Essential to Mr. Cohen's position would seem to be the dismissal of the intentional argument—was the *intent* of the sit-ins primarily to convey an idea? Was the *intent* of the action a disobedience of an immoral order? (One could argue that there is an implicit immoral "order" to acquiesce in the national policy toward Vietnam. At what point does it become explicit?—when one is ordered to report for induction?—when one is ordered to Vietnam?—when one is ordered to the front lines?—when one is ordered to shoot a suspected Vietcong?—with or without his hands tied behind his back?) The recent Supreme Court rulings would indicate that intent may very well be all important, and if so, the legal point is far from lost.

A person's willingness to accept "punishment" for his "illegal" protests certainly enhances his moral position, but the point of the demonstrators, whom I do not have the advantage of knowing, would seem to be that the punishment, not the protest, is illegal. They did not sit in to make martyrs of themselves. They wished to protest the actions of their government. They wished their protest to be noted both by the government and their fellow citizens. In this they have succeeded. *Ezra Shahn*

Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: Along with William Crosby Miller and Matthew Zion, I was arrested for sitting in at Congressman Cohelan's office in Oakland, Calif.; we were found guilty by a jury on three counts . . . [and] face up to eighteen months plus nearly $1,000 fines. . . . Having put our bodies on the line, not just our minds, I . . . ask for special privileges, spacewise, in your tightly packed magazine.

Carl Cohen's apologia for the liberal mind recalls Earl Browder's famous definition of a liberal: "A liberal is a person who raises doubt and indecision to the level of a principle." Having delineated the issues clearly, he proceeds to express horrors of "going too far" and "is self-defeating." He feels that we, in our protests, open up "the right" for the K.K.K. to do the same thing.

Hasn't that "right" always been there? I am reminded of the liberal Jewish groups during and before World War II; they told us "don't protest" Hitler because "he will kill more Jews." . . .

Cohen comments that "accepting punishment" for dissent adds to the dissent's moral thrust. Agreed. Who is avoiding punishment? But pleading "not guilty" in a trespass case is not avoiding punishment, as we just have experienced; we are going to appeal this all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. . . . Further, there can be cases where pleading "guilty" is more to the point, but to use punishment as a principle "to further proof of his concern" is a very odd attitude, especially when he is using my body for his concern. . . .

George Kauffman

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Asia Trap: What Do We Do Now?

AMERICA AND CHINA: A New Approach to Asia. *By Chang Hsin-hai. Simon & Schuster. 288 pp. $5.95.*

VIETNAM: BETWEEN TWO TRUCES. *By Jean Lacouture. Introduction by Joseph Kraft. Translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. Random House. 295 pp. $5.95.*

JONATHAN MIRSKY
A teacher of Chinese at the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Mirsky has recently returned from a visit to Vietnam. He is one of the contributors to Peace in Vietnam: A New Approach in Southeast Asia *(Hill and Wang).*

The Chinese evacuate their southern cities and the factories of Hanoi are removed to the hills. As the Vietnamese and Chinese prepare themselves for the worst we may well ask ourselves why they are so stubborn. Do they actually prefer to die? If they do, only history can explain why, and yet in Washington the President and all his men still say: "Sure we've made mistakes—but what do we do now?"

This is to imply that the current American perspective always contains the answer. Thus, when General Thi was removed, our Saigon embassy was "pleased"; a war lord had been displaced, and the Ky government was yet stronger. As that government now teeters on the edge of the abyss, Washington becomes nervous. An official complains: "The worst part is that the (Ky) government isn't even trying to do anything about this." He has forgotten the events of 1963 when Ngo Dinh Diem attacked the pagodas; Marshal Ky probably remembers.

Besides being reminded about the Buddhists, Washington is rediscovering Peking, too, and a new policy feebly begins to take shape as famous China specialists inform surprised-sounding Senators that China is trying to avoid war; that Lin Piao's speech (so garbled by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara) urged indigenous civil wars unaided from without; that China's self-image took a severe battering from foreigners for an entire century before 1949.

It is not merely to rehash the past that Chang Hsin-hai and Jean Lacouture have written their books. Each is seeking reconciliation; each has concluded that only through understanding the agonies of the past can present perspectives have meaning.

Not that historical analysis leads to wholesome ends. Washington officials are fond of quoting articles by, for instance, George A. Carver, Jr., who publishes in *Foreign Affairs,* where he is identified as a "student of political theory." Carver has also been identified as an employee of the CIA. In an article in *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1965) entitled "The Real Revolution in South Vietnam," he describes the NLF: it "is and always has been a contrived and consciously directed military campaign." The military "Young Turks," however, are among "the prime examples" of "culturally autochthonous revolutionaries," patriots whose activities, Carver admits, have so far been confined to the cities, so that the peasants do not (as yet) have a "feeling of direct identification with the fortunes of any Saigon regime." This is sad, he feels, because the Communists are totally antipathetic to everything Vietnamese, including the "peasant's immemorial attachment to the land he tills."

Carver neglects to comment that more than 80 per cent of the land in Long An province, for example, is not peasant owned (although under the Vietminh the contrary was true), that the "autochthonous" military have their strongest tie with the French ("our governments are irrelevant," was the criticism I heard most in Vietnam last summer), and that it was the U.S.-supported Diem government which made the strongest modern onslaught on Vietnamese local democracy by appointing, in 1956, village and hamlet chiefs where they had been traditionally elected. Nor did the Ngo family rest there: in 1961, again with American cooperation, Ngo Dinh Nhu devised the strategic hamlets. Lacouture sums up a social catastrophe as follows:

> By touching the villages Nhu and his friends touched at the very foundations of Vietnamese peasant culture . . . the raw material of public life, and even the basis of private life. The village even more than the individual was an entity . . . the village . . . negotiated with the central power. Everything derived from that entity, and all came down to it. It was the expression of that "harmony beneath the heavens" that any society imbued with Confucianism considered essential.

The snag is that immoderation is not confined to one camp. Chang Hsin-hai, a Harvard Ph.D. of 1922, with a distinguished academic and diplomatic career, now resides and teaches in this country. *America and China* is a plea for mutual understanding. Professor Chang speaks again and again of Chinese moderation in all things. What then are we to make of these statements? "I do not believe it is possible to find in the whole realm of Chinese thinking anyone who has justified war." (Sun Tzu before the Han, Mao Tse-tung nowadays.) "No two peoples are more alike than the Chinese and the Americans." "Though the Han and T'ang Dynasties are considered as being expansive, there was no effort at all to employ military force for the conquest of neighboring peoples." (Vietnam? Korea? Central Asia?) Japan should "realize" that "her civilization is after all of a derivative nature." (Language? Food? Manners?) "The concept of simplicity, of restraint, is utterly alien to the Hindu soul." (On the subject of India Professor Chang is wild.) In traditional China, law was settled in teahouses, "a kind of people's courthouse. . . . There was no need to refer to any legal compendium." (Has Professor Chang forgotten the great imperial Codes? That of the Ch'ing alone, with its multifarious prescriptions for torture and death, all depending on delicate class and familial distinctions, should make him ignore the teahouse.) This kind of thing will do no lasting good, and despite Professor Chang's passionate and rare concern for coexistence will simply supply ammunition to the hawks.

Vietnam: Between Two Truces is another matter. Although not Vietnamese, Lacouture is also personally involved, with years of official and journalistic experience behind him. His book is not for the beginner. It is rhetorical and loosely tied together (and rather badly translated) but in it Lacouture lays open the bare bones that Administration cant tries to conceal: the French turning a colonial war into an international one (when General de Lattre de Tassigny went to Washington in 1951); the amazing Vietminh capitulation under Chinese and Russian pressure at Geneva; the birth of the NLF under the lash of Diem's witch hunt (the Vietminh was among the last to join the struggle, the various national and religious groups not feeling bound by the 1954 accords); the endless efforts of the NLF to remain independent of Hanoi; the "quadrille of the Generals" in Saigon (Carver's revolution-

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aries); and the often murky aspirations of the Buddhists whom Lacouture points out *as a church* to be almost completely political, rather than religious.

It is indeed in the disjointed Buddhist sections that Lacouture is often most enlightening; their foremost object is to get rid of foreigners. In this they feel that cooperation with the National Liberation Front may be momentarily useful but that in the end they will supplant it. Who knows? Our relations in Saigon are always baffling. Thich Tam Chau, one of the leading monks, cordially sent me home from an interview in an army jeep, complete with soldier-driver which had been supplied to him by the military government he had just been criticizing.

The book is full of important details, veritable nuggets of thought-provoking information, almost never documented, all somewhat overassertive. It should come about sixth on a Vietnam reading list, but without it things may never hold together. For instance, the NLF mortaring of Pleiku in February, 1965, which afforded Johnson an excuse for bombing North Viet-

Vietnam Booklist

Below is a selection of books published from 1964 to the present, which are recommended as furnishing background information on China, the Vietnamese war, and the problems of Southeast Asia. It is not intended as a complete list but as a guide to the reader.

PEACE IN VIETNAM: A New Approach in Southeast Asia. *By Members of the Vietnam Working Party of the American Friends Service Committee. Hill & Wang. 112 pp. $3. Paper 95c.*

A simple, concise and well-documented background account which calls for a turn in American policy toward constructive approaches and a new understanding of the social forces compelling change in Southeast Asia.

THE NEW FACE OF WAR. *By Malcolm W. Browne. Bobbs-Merrill. 275 pp. $5.*

A report by a Pulitzer Prize-winning AP correspondent who witnessed the conflict in the South. (Reviewed by Bernard B. Fall, *The Nation,* May 17, 1965.)

VIET-NAM: Inside Story of the Guerilla War. *By Wilfred G. Burchett. International Publishers. 253 pp. $4.95. Paper $1.95.*

An account of warfare in South Vietnam, written from the point of view of the National Liberation Front. It contains unique data on the organization of the Vietcong. (Reviewed by Bernard B. Fall, *The Nation,* May 17, 1965.)

20TH CENTURY CHINA. *By O. Edmund Clubb. Columbia University Press. 470 pp. $2.75 paper.*

An evaluation of the effects of communism on China's recent history by a former foreign service officer who was in north China in 1949.

STREET WITHOUT JOY: From the Indochina War to the War in Viet-Nam (4th revised ed.). *By Bernard B. Fall. Stackpole. 408 pp. $7.95.*

A military history of the Indo-China war, pointing out parallels in the current war.

THE TWO VIET-NAMS: A Political and Military History (5th revised ed.). *By Bernard B. Fall. Frederick A. Praeger. 493 pp. $7.95.*

One of the best comprehensive coverages of political problems in both South and North Vietnam, with an excellent biography of Ho Chi Minh.

THE CHINESE VIEW OF THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD. *By C. P. FitzGerald. Oxford University Press. 78 pp. $1.50 paper.*

Outlines China's past and present drives to world leadership.

VIETNAM: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis. *Edited by Marvin E. Gettleman. Fawcett World Library. 448 pp. 95c paper.*

An extremely useful compilation of documents, sections of books, and articles concerning the background and conduct of the French war, the Geneva Agreements, the Diem administration and American involvement.

THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE. *By David Halberstam. Random House. 323 pp. $5.95.*

The Pulitzer Prize-winning book by *The New York Times's* correspondent. An excellent account of political and military events in South Vietnam from 1961 through 1964, covering the 1963 crisis and the fall of Diem. (Reviewed by Charles Mohr, *The Nation,* May 17, 1965.)

GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (2nd ed.). *Edited by George McT. Kahin. Cornell University Press. $8.50.*

Those sections on historical background, contemporary setting, political processes and major problems of North and South Vietnam by Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner Normand, and the sections on Cambodia and Laos by Roger Smith, are particularly relevant.

VIETNAM: BETWEEN TWO TRUCES. *By Jean Lacouture. Random House. 295 pp. $5.95.*

Reviewed in this issue.

MISSION IN TORMENT: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam. *By John Mecklin. Doubleday & Co. 318 pp. $4.95.*

A report of errors in American policy and conduct in Vietnam by a former high official of the United States Information Agency in Saigon.

VIETNAM DIVIDED. *By B. S. N. Murti. Asia Publishing House. $8.50.*

A full account of the findings of the International Control Commission by a man who served as Deputy Secretary General and Public Relations Officer of the ICC.

THE VIET-NAM READER. *Edited by Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall. Random House. 415 pp. $5.95. Vintage. $2.45 paper.*

A comprehensive collection of articles and papers documenting the background and development of American involvement in Vietnam.

For those who read French, the books listed below are source material for much of the information in the volumes in English.

Indochine dix ans à indépendence. *By Georges Chaffoard. Calman Levy.*

Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952. *By Philippe Devillers. Editions du Seuil.*

La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954. *By Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers. Editions du Seuil.*

Viet-Nam: Sociologie d'une guerre. *By Paul Mus. Editions du Seuil.*

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nam, is given brief but stimulating treatment. Lacouture seems not to know of Charles Robert's claim in *LBJ's Inner Circle* that the President planned to escalate the war to North Vietnam even before the 1964 election. He surmises, however, that local guerrillas may have become alarmed at the simultaneous advent in Vietnam of both Bundy and Kosygin. Was another Saigon/Hanoi deal in the making, where the southerners were to be sold out again? The quick United States reaction to the Pleiku incident leads Lacouture to the conclusion that the U.S., too, was fed up. "We didn't come here to lose," he was told.

Lacouture sees the only possible solution not involving the disappearance of Vietnam: "integrate the NLF into the legal fabric of the south; avoid specification of when reunification should take place (he indicates from personal knowledge that even Hanoi visualizes a long separation); and establish between the two 'states' . . . normal relations."

The thick weave of his book, through which the themes often slip like knitting needles, sometimes obscures. But his judgment—on hell itself—is not erratic. Lacouture echoes that most awful of Thucydidean accounts, the debate at Melos, when the Athenians announced to the tiny island of Melos that "might made right." He is cool enough: "After attaining a certain degree of power does one lose a sense of balance and concern for one's reputation? If one is so strong, does one need to be esteemed?"

The City and the Road

THE RAILROAD AND THE SPACE PROGRAM: An Exploration in Historical Analogy. *Edited by Bruce Mazlish. M.I.T. Press. 223 pp. $7.50.*

THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA: A History of City Planning in the United States. *By John Reps. Princeton University Press. 574 pp. $25.*

ALAN TRACHTENBERG

Mr. Trachtenberg teaches English at Pennsylvania State University. He is the author of Brooklyn Bridge: Fact and Symbol *(Oxford University Press).*

In addition to their practical functions, man-made environments serve a society by projecting its values into spatial forms. "To build," observed Paul Valéry, "is to give reality to a certain desire of the eye." The simplest thatched hut implies a way of life, a set of desires and choices by the builder, who is quite likely also the inhabitant, and it is possible to deduce from it a relation to nature, a sense of family and community and a system of decorum. Henry Adams practiced this kind of analysis in his evocative descriptions of Chartres. The fullest experience of the cathedral was nothing less than the experience of an entire civilization. Building techniques and techniques of devotion complemented each other, and the created environment was a recognizable form for communal life.

Sensitivity to total surroundings as an expression of essential values is a precious faculty in danger of disappearing in our age. It is still the property of artists, especially film makers, but much criticism of urban environments is either narrowly sociological or obscurely aesthetic, carping about "beauty" as if that quality were something marketable, something separate from an entire way of living (can one society really "beautify" itself while it "defoliates" another?). We lack a social criticism which begins with the full assault of urban sensations, the random and undifferentiated signals from our physical environments, and explores their meaning for biological and cultural life.

Neither of these books has any such comprehensive aim, but each does treat aspects of our man-made environment. Taken together they provide historical perspectives upon two cardinal artifacts of our civilization, railroads and cities, and touch upon a third, space capsules. Although the last is still problematic, these artifacts call to mind basic American preoccupations, with transportation, with speed, with colonization of the continent and exploitation of land, and with technological mastery. The railroad and the space program are, for many, typical examples of America's superb technology and unsurpassed industrial plant. They represent successful achievement. Cities, on the other hand, seem to have lagged behind. Many people are now wondering how, skillful makers that we are, we could have allowed our cities to become such messes. One explanation may be the legendary restlessness of Americans: settlements have commanded less allegiance than open roads. Americans tend to live in the future. This gives many of our cities, as Sartre remarked in 1945, "a strictly temporary reality." Rather than a fixed and permanent place, rather than a home, he wrote, the North American city was like "a camp in the desert." It was a constantly moving landscape, seen from a highway. Henry James made similar observations in 1905. Perhaps inner conflicts between settledness and restlessness, fixity and fluidity, past and future, in short between values represented by cities and those represented by "travel" (land, sea or air), have influenced America's unique and paradoxical shape.

Although they do not raise such questions directly, these books contribute to our knowledge of the interrelated phenomena of city and road. The first is an experimental book. A collection of eight essays by as many scholars, it is something in the way of a report by a scholarly body to a government agency. The study is the first in a series to be published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at the request of NASA to inquire "into the impact of our national space efforts on American society." The book actually has little to say about the space program. It is a group of studies in several fields (history, economics, business administration, intellectual history) of the various effects of the railroad upon 19th-century America.

The point is to see if the space program has anything in common with the railroad, or to see, in the words of the editor, "how useful historical analogy, at least in theory, may be as a 'device of anticipation.'" The basis of the analogy, as Professor Mazlish explains in a somewhat cumbersome introduction, is that both innovations are "social inventions," that is, are simultaneously technological, economic, political, sociological and intellectual events. Developed initially for perhaps very limited purposes, their effects ramify throughout society.

This idea is obvious enough, and not entirely new. Lynn White, Jr., published an interesting study of similar problems a few years ago, in *Medieval Technology and Social Change*. But in spite of the editor's elaborate machinery, this book is far from a convincing beginning of "a new branch of comparative history." The analogy of space program to railroad remains quite speculative and quite vague. The separate essays deal exclusively with very specialized phases of the railroad story, with faint and mostly labored sidelong glances into space. The authors themselves seem hardly convinced of their role as pathfinders in comparative studies.

This failure to fill out the space-program half of the equation is especially disappointing in light of some of the intriguing findings regarding the railroad. Simply as a collection of essays demonstrating the "multivariate" effects of the railroad, the book is very convincing, and generates a certain enthusiasm about group studies. Two points in particular, in the area of economics, struck me as

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extremely pertinent to the space effort.

One is that, contrary to an official point of view, the railroad was not the decisive factor in the rapid industrialization of the 19th century. "The net effect of the railroad," writes Paul H. Cootner, "was positive, but it never was so positive that it made the difference between development of this country and stagnation." The economy into which it was introduced was already a thriving one. Moreover, as Robert William Fogel points out, without railroads, canals and overland hauling might have been further developed without serious economic setbacks. How, then, did the idea develop that railroad building was a life or death necessity, requiring government grants of free land? (The far from favorable effect of the free railroad lands upon urban planning is amply discussed by John Reps in the next book.) The railroad industry may have been the first to foist upon the country the idea that what's good for us is good for you. It would have been valuable to examine the economic nexus of the space — and missile — industry in the same light.

The second point, also suggested by Fogel, is that the railroad, by "diverting resources," may actually have retarded technological development in other areas, such as motor transport. This question gives the idea of progress a certain jolt: what has been, and is being, sacrificed in the way of perhaps more useful "social inventions," in order to fulfill essentially political, or military, priorities? The matter of suppressed inventions would make a fascinating chapter in the history of our technology.

I would like to have had more than the single, rather lonesome, essay on the intellectual implications of the railroad. If technology transforms reality, it also alters the mind's apparatus for grasping reality. Any study of the impact of invention ought to strike a balance between internal and external history. Thus any history of modern society (and America, George Santayana wrote, is the "unalloyed essence" of modern society) will have to include the subliminal belief that nature can be wholly transformed into a total artifact.

The railroad itself taught this lesson, that man need not conform to natural obstacles. Nature is a field of resistances to be overcome and forms to be obliterated. Why go around a mountain when you can tunnel through it? Why accept the unevenness of the earth's surface when you can flatten all things and create your own level? Why accept the caprice of weather and terrain when steam and rails and telegraphic signals provide a man-made world, uniform and subject to your will? The final product of this lesson is,

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of course, the fully artificial and machine-controlled environment of the space capsule, an "environmental system" in which, as Lewis Mumford bleakly prophesies, "life would again narrow down to the physical functions of breathing, eating, and excretion." What are the implications of this prospect for man's concept of a desirable environment?

The book's cover is a striking though probably unintentional image of this problem. A field of bright blue is divided by black borders into two oblong panels, the left-hand one showing in the lower half a silhouetted steam locomotive, almost faded into the blue background; on the right, rising toward the top of the field, is a blazing rocket in stark black and white, its tail of flames a white heat. Both objects are detached from any meaningful relations, but at least there is a man showing in the cab of the engine. It might also occur to some readers, as they gaze at the dual icons, that almost a hundred years ago Walt Whitman anticipated the analogy. In "Passage to India" the connection of the transcontinental railroad became an image of final terrestrial connections, including the end of war and the brotherhood of the races, and led to new spatial launchings: "O farther, farther, farther sail." Deprived of the poet's outdated optimism, it would be pleasant for us to have some clearer notion of where the cone of the blazing rocket is headed, and if we are all invited for the trip.

The Making of Urban America is a book of a different order. Its scope is completely terrestrial, and thus its bearing upon a living environment more direct. The book assembles in handsome format a rich collection of materials documenting the practice of city planning in the United States, from the beginnings to about 1900. More than 300 illustrations of original plans, land maps and city views, all impressively printed, make the book a virtual encyclopedia of American city planning. It is a pioneering work and should be of great value for future, more specialized, studies.

Its immediate value for the layman derives in part from current popular excitement over "our cities." Few expressions have greater public resonance today than "our cities." The words excite strong feelings, mainly anxiety about blight, riots and uprisings, water shortages, strikes, rising real estate costs. But there is more hysteria than hard thought. One reason is the relative obscurity of the concept of city in our culture. For reasons that are obvious, we do not have an urban tradition in the European sense; our past is too brief, most of our cities began as colonial towns (street patterns preceded buildings) and we had no institutionalized resistances to the 19th-century onslaught of real estate speculation, industrialization and rapid population growth. Dissolution of old patterns and constant reconstruction, rather than the slow accretion of a past, have been the rule. For plain historical reasons our cities have rarely solidified into genuine places. "There is no there there," Gertrude Stein quipped. Even in legal definition most cities have an ambiguous status: our 212 "standard metropolitan statistical areas" contain 18,000 governmental units; there are 1,500 separate political units within 50 miles of Times Square alone. Add to these conditions the familiar Jeffersonian, Populist and fundamentalist suspicions of large cities, and it is obvious why such a fog surrounds the very idea of city.

Nevertheless, we have been essentially urban throughout our history, the city exercising a steadily increasing amount of economic and political power, as well as social appeal. We are now probably the most urbanized society in the world. "The city," *Life* said recently, "is the mirror of Americans pursuing happiness." A curious way of putting it, but nonetheless true. The city is probably the most expressive single emblem of how we live and have lived. Nothing is more important than learning how to "read" this emblem.

Reps's purpose is more modest than this; he is not concerned with the place of the city in the collective imagination. His chief interest is with "the main influences that have governed the form of America's cities." Although he discusses the role of land speculation and of the railroad as a colonizer of the West, the major influences are formal, the surprisingly complex number of basic patterns developed in American towns. The chief patterns include the Renaissance fortified town brought over by original settlers (French and Spanish especially), the New England village complex, the Philadelphia gridiron, the baroque plan of Washington, the romantic picturesque plans accompanying the rise of city parks and suburbs, and the strict checkerboard and grid plans for cities laid out for speculation. Each of these phases, and minor variations such as the fascinating plans for utopian and religious communities, is fully documented.

One trouble is, however, that Professor Reps tends to discuss each plan apart from other cultural facts. Much of his attention is taken with exhaustive analyses of original drawings, whether they were followed in practice or not, in order to isolate planning concepts. This, together with a deliberate neglect of urban architecture, gives the text a sometimes stifling two-dimensional effect. We too rarely get the sense of specific plans as historical products, as consequences of economic and legal realities. Moreover there is little effort to join spatial conceptions of towns with larger conceptions of the city in the dominant culture.

The idea of the city is itself an influence upon its form, and vice versa. One idea, still prevalent, is that the city, like the land itself, exists for the sake of profit making. The grid idea is a quantification of space, neatly correlated to the profit motive, which is a quantification of all things. If the city is a mirror, then Americans can witness therein a confusion of forms which betrays the confusion of values in their culture. In legal structure, real estate arrangements, public buildings and residences, transportation facilities, the American city seems dedicated to the proposition that the quest for personal wealth, personal power and personal pleasures is the ultimate explanation of human behavior.

Respect for common spaces is highly uncommon. Devotion toward the street as a place *to be* rather than a highway is rare. We classify people who live in cities as owners or tenants, employers or employees (blue or white collar), Negro or white, English- or Spanish-speaking, not as inhabitants of a single place, as mutual seekers after a collective good life. With a good deal of affection, Reps portrays the New England village as one of the few planned places in this country designed for community life, for living and not for commerce or conquest. Maybe his book will help us recapture that image.

LAST SONGS

What do they sing, the
birds coasting down the twilight,
banking
over blackened woods
which fill with
pressures,
aspirations . . . rumbles . . . instants . . .
their frayed, harp-dragging wings
curved over the world
like a lover's arms
so used that when he sleeps they form
her absence . . . ?

Flights
down imminent darkness . . .
last songs that we betray . . .
Whatever it is
that bars us from heaven —
wrath, sloth, greed, fear — let us
reinvent it on earth
as song.

GALWAY KINNELL

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The End of a Period

THE PETITIONERS: The Story of the Supreme Court and the Negro. *By Loren Miller. Pantheon Books. 461 pp. $8.95.*

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON
Mrs. Norton is Assistant Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. She has been published in Dissent *and* New Politics.

We are at the very end of a period in our legal history. Judicial activism in favor of the rights of Negroes has accomplished about as much as courts can do. An inert legislature has finally been stirred to its Congressional duty. A Negro electorate is being created in the South and is already enthusiastically seeking public office, while in the North Negro votes are multiplying as fleeing whites leave the great cities to what may soon be black rulers. The search for more dynamic progress daily turns Negroes to politics to replace the old reliance on court decisions. For the first time in thirty years the Supreme Court is a receding institution in the Negro's long struggle. In *The Petitioners,* Loren Miller looks back at the Court, records its often dreary performance toward the Negro, and ends in celebration of its redemption.

Supreme Court decisions on race since the 1930s—Miller chooses the Scottsboro case as the point of noteworthy change—make up a dossier impressive for its principled progression toward a constitutional duty. But the Supreme Court that we today identify with racial equality is an entirely modern phenomenon. Even the Congress, which so long acquiesced in the racial barbarities of the states, had a period of fair dealing with the Negro after the Civil War. It was the Court that emasculated the work of that Congress, presaging and encouraging the inventors of Jim Crow.

The Petitioners brings together the Court's race record from the time of the writing of the Constitution until the last sit-in cases. Miller's court is a court of cases, not of men. The author, a Negro, a California judge, and for many years a civil rights attorney, does not proceed from the assumption that personalities (and especially great Supreme Court Justices) determine history. Day, Brandeis, Cardozo and Hughes lived with and helped to develop the prevailing theory of "separate but equal" even as they were writing the great civil liberties decisions for which they are still remembered.

Although a well-known partisan of daring constitutional interpretation [see *The Nation,* Oct. 20, 1962], Miller is scholarly in his approach to two important cases against the Supreme Court. First, prior to the Civil War and continuing into the 1960s, the Court intensified its long-developing role as exclusive but not always protective guardian of the Negro. Second, against the will and intention of the Congress that wrote the Civil War amendments, the Court created the "state-action" dilemma that even today requires it to find, often tortuously, the hand of the state, before it allows itself or any other branch of government to protect the rights of Negroes. The judicial guardian had naturally chosen to pronounce ultimate doctrine. The result was power and policy in the same hands.

Had the Court chosen to implement Congressional will after the Civil War, it would surely have been at war with the rest of the country by the turn of the century. The Compromise of 1876 marked the stunning retreat of Congressional initiative on problems of racial equality. The Court, on the other hand, had never been committed to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as instruments to relieve the totality of the old oppression. Yet Congress had struck out almost everywhere unequal treatment could be found or expected (except, of course, in economic areas, where laissez faire wrote most legislation). The three most significant pieces of postwar legislation — the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the so-called Klan Act of 1871, and the 1875 Act—prohibited private as well as state acts of discrimination. It was the Court that exempted the mob, the Klan and the bigot by a sleight-of-hand restoration of the prewar dualism in citizenship, so that only national citizenship encompassing narrowly defined federal rights could be protected by the central government through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment was deflated to mean the mere release from the physical confinement of slavery, and not from its attendant conditions, as a broader interpretation would have allowed. The Fifteenth Amendment, which was designed to give Negroes the right to vote, was said *not* to have conferred that right at all but simply to have afforded protection against state interference. Even with the added capital of constitutional amendments and good legislation, the judicial guardian had not yet begun to act in the best interests of its ward.

Not until the sit-ins did any Supreme Court Justice revive the 19th-century heresy of the first Justice Harlan that the Fourteenth Amendment itself protects against private discrimination. In *Bouie* v. *South Carolina,* Justice Douglas said that "the right to be served in places of public accommodation is an incident of national citizenship." But for all of the Court's return to the controlling purposes of the Civil War amendments, only two or three Justices, at best, can today be counted on to sanction so broad an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 rescued the Court from the necessity to repudiate its strict interpretation, yet even in the 1964 Act Congress paid deference to the Court's state-action tradition by grounding the legislation mainly on the commerce clause, a thought which never occurred to the Congress that had written a similar bill in 1875, so convinced was it that the Fourteenth Amendment created all the necessary authority.

Loren Miller does not neglect other periods, and often without explicitly making

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the point gives us clues to modern practices, such as the preference for civil suits today as against the criminal remedies of the old civil rights laws. After the Civil War, Congress had sought to share the Court's guardianship of the Negro through the enactment of criminal statutes which allowed the government to initiate suit for the penniless Negro. All-white juries unwilling to indict and convict and the absence of follow-through jury reforms from Congress soon made such suits impractical. With the rise of private corporate litigators like the NAACP to bear the expense, civil suits have become the pattern in modern civil rights litigation.

Miller's book is an important reference and synthesis. Nowhere else will the layman find a complete and readable account of the Court's long-time dealings with the Negro. Occasional strings of clichés mar the text ("But the case was not permitted to die with a whimper instead of a bang, because it had become a pawn in a struggle for political power as it dragged its way through the courts"); nevertheless, *The Petitioners* is a significant contribution to the literature of race and of the Court.

The Longest Journey

THE LONGEST WAY HOME: Chief Alfred C. Sam's Back-to-Africa Movement. *By William E. Bittle and Gilbert Geis. Wayne State University Press. 229 pp. $8.50.*

ANN J. LANE
Miss Lane teaches American History at Sarah Lawrence College. She was one of the founders of the Socialist Scholars Conference, held in New York in the fall of 1965.

On August 21, 1914, the *S.S. Liberia,* flying a British flag and carrying sixty passengers, cleared the port of Galveston and headed for the Gold Coast, British West Africa. The passengers were all Negroes who were returning home to their own people, they believed, and to the promise of a better existence. The leader of the group was Alfred Charles Sam, who claimed to be an African tribal chief, and who had spent the previous year recruiting emigrants from back-country cotton farms in eastern Oklahoma. Left behind as the *Liberia* pulled away were some 500 persons, part of Sam's following who could not make the African trip this time. Another body of Sam's faithful was abandoning the camp at Weleetka, Okla., where for eight months they had collected, hoping to be among those departing for Africa.

The story of these people is told in *The Longest Way Home* by two sociologists whose interest in the rise and growth of all-Negro communities in the Southwest led them independently to this subject. The unique value of a small study of this nature is that it can illuminate problems well beyond its immediate scope. Such is the case here, for this is a tortured story which traces the evolution of fantastic hopes to total desperation of a group of people whose final solution was to reject a country they no longer could regard as their own.

The Sam movement illustrates an ultimate stage of passivity in a people who were not acquiescent: in the extreme, the most vigorous and for them only feasible protest — the emigration to a distant and fictionalized homeland. But like all stories built on fantasy, the reality is grubby and pathetic.

Efforts at colonization dot the history of the American nation. In the early 1800s the American Colonization Society founded Liberia as a refuge for American freedmen. But this was the first large-scale back-to-Africa movement conceived exclusively by a Negro and for Negroes. It was a program in many ways unique in American history, for it still stands as the only plan which posed emigration to Africa as its primary goal. (The Garvey movement of a few years later included not only emigration to Africa, as almost an afterthought, but also the establishment of the Universal Negro Improvement Association to project the Negro into commerce and industry and to provide him a context in which his development might equal that of the whites.)

The details of Sam's movement, how he arrived in Oklahoma, his method of reaching the Negroes, the events which followed when his party of colonists sailed for Africa, and the ultimate outcome of his efforts, fill only half the pages. The earlier sections describe the backdrop of Oklahoma in 1913 against which the movement was acted out, and the Negro-white relations characteristic of that period.

In Okfuskee County, Okla., where Sam did the largest share of his recruiting, Negroes were numerous; and during its youthful Indian Territory days a number of Negro enclaves evolved. In a period in which anti-Negro sentiment was consolidating throughout the nation, accompanied by violence and the establishment of Jim Crow patterns, a new resolution of the racial problem was developing: the establishment of politically and socially free all-Negro communities. It was with such a vision that the city of Boley, in Okfuskee County, came into existence. Recruitment began for settlers: "Come and help prove . . . that the Negro is a law-making and law-abiding citizen, and help us solve the great racial problem that is now before us."

Say have you heard the story
Of a little colored town,
Way over in the Nation
On such lovely sloping ground
. . . . O 'tis a pretty country
And the Negroes own it, too
With not a single white man here
To tell us what to do —
In Boley.

The inhabitants of Boley had taken seriously the American creed, not yet aware that it was not to apply to them. Booker T. Washington, among many others, had grand hopes for Boley.

> It is a striking evidence of the progress made in thirty years. . . . (This is) not a helpless and ignorant horde of black people, but land-seekers and home-builders. . . . Boley . . . represents a dawning race consciousness, a wholesome desire to do something to make the race respected.

Results of the election of 1906 carried an ominous warning for the white people in the region surrounding Boley. The Negro settlement, united and determined to stay united in its franchise, held the key to the area's strength. Thus began the end of Boley's short-lived dreams of county control. What happened to the Boley Negroes occurred, in one form or another, throughout the nation. Their political power was broken, first by indirect means such as gerrymandering, and then with a frontal assault by the adoption of a "grandfather clause" which defined the right of franchise in terms of ancestry. Simultaneously, Jim Crow regulations were being enforced and upheld by the courts.

The Oklahoma Negroes, still clinging to their dreams, went through all the legal forms of protest, but slowly these dreams, based as they were upon expectations of legal justice, were relinquished. Meanwhile, a wealthy Negro resident went to Africa to seek prospects for settlement of Oklahoma Negroes. In that same month, the new state of Oklahoma had its first lynching. White organizations were formed to discourage further immigration of Negroes and to encourage the withdrawal of those already occupying land. The Negroes responded:

> Typically, they attempted to deal with the articulated rationalizations of the clubs, the removal of the backward and worthless Negroes, rather

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than with the real principle . . . the fiery opposition to the presence of any Negroes.

Negroes began to ferret out their own worst element, trying desperately to do the work of the clubs before the clubs had a chance to do it for themselves.

Ultimately disillusionment came with the understanding that there would be no Negro autonomy in Oklahoma, no Negro dignity, no growing respect from white neighbors, and no industrial and agricultural prosperity. It was into this situation that Alfred Charles Sam, emissary for the Chiefs of the Tribes of Akim, came. He could hardly have made a better choice or come at a better time.

Chief Sam, soft-spoken and gentle, covered rural Oklahoma, trying to convince Negroes to buy shares in his company, selling at $25 each, with which he would purchase a ship to transport the stockholders to Africa. His plan? To bring "his wandering black brothers back to their fatherland."

The local white papers assumed he was a tool of white confidence men, unable to believe that a Negro could have concocted so elaborate a fraud himself. The Negro press, traditionally fairly conservative, joined the anti-Sam attacks. He was labeled a fake and a swindler, but the masses flocked to his meetings and purchased his stock. Thousands sold their property, accumulated their belongings and gathered together in makeshift camps, awaiting their departure. The weather turned severe and the situation for the colonists reached desperation. Sam was finally able to raise the necessary funds to purchase a ship.

Negro leaders and politicians continued to be, at best, critical of the movement. But it was the official and unrelenting harassment from British and American authorities that provided the most serious obstacles. From his diplomatic post in Washington, Sir Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, Britain's ambassador to the United States, tried unceasingly to abort Sam's colonization project. One would think that with his government threatened with a European war, the Sam affair could not have seemed more trivial. Yet the possibility of a Negro exodus from the United States to a British colony posed an embarrassing prospect to the ambassador. The United States Government instituted a harassing investigation. But this investigation found, as did the others that followed, that the company was legitimately established, funds collected were indeed used to purchase the ship which was to carry the colonists to Africa, that Sam had filed a deed in Accra for lands on which the colonists would settle. Yet the two governments continued to help perpetuate the dilemma: permitting conditions so dreadful that the Negroes wished to flee and yet refusing them the right to do so.

The colonists remained faithful through long, cold and despairing months during which the *Liberia* lay at anchor. Sam's dream was now the only one they had. They listened and believed when he said: "Our plan is established and when the people of our race see that we are successful, this ship will be crowded on every trip that she makes to Africa."

Despite a head tax of £25 per immigrant imposed by the British, despite a devastating forty-five-day delay for "inspection" held by the British at Sierra Leone, the *Liberia* did arrive at the Promised Land.

At this point in the story the source material, meager all along, becomes even sketchier and only the outlines of the final disillusionment exist. "They did not want to be Americans; but now they found that they did not want to be Africans either." Debts mounted and the company went bankrupt. But it was the psychological dissociation of the emigrants from their brethren which was the final, and perhaps worst, defeat in the long and fruitless search for a place. These Negroes had truly lived the torments of their dilemma.

The brief life of this experiment attests once more to what Gunnar Myrdal has called a "dissatisfaction so deep that it amounts to a hopelessness of ever gaining full life in America." If only briefly, Sam at least had given them something to live for, although that expectation, like the earlier ones, was based on fantasy.

The authors have pieced together an interesting and moving account from the extremely limited primary materials available. But some unsatisfying aspects remain; principally, the enigmatic and distant characterization of Sam. The authors' claim that "whether or not Sam was a fraud is in every sense unimportant," is something of an evasion; similarly, if the details of life in Accra are unavailable (what actually happened and why the settlements failed so miserably), then perhaps the authors might have provided a fuller picture by way of speculation on the nature of emigration and its implicit ramifications for the American Negro.

But within its limitations, *The Longest Way Home,* a journey which the Negro community has barely begun, is a fascinating contribution to historical literature.

ART / Maurice Grosser

Mr. Grosser, artist and writer, is the author of The Critic's Eye *(Bobbs-Merrill).*

The two most popular exhibitions in Paris this spring are about the 1920s. Six days a week lines wait before the doors of the Musée de l'Orangerie des Tuileries where the Paul Guillaume-Jean Walter collection of modern old masters—given to the nation by Mme. Guillaume-Walter, widow of the two celebrated picture merchants — is now on permanent display. And the exposition called Les Années 25 at the Musée des Arts Decoratifs, of furniture, objects, paintings, dresses and two automobiles, is equally well attended, and will be until it closes on May 16. The two shows, taken together, give a nostalgic picture of what we liked and admired and bought when the world was forty years younger than it is today.

The Guillaume-Walter collection has 145 pictures by twenty-four artists. Les Années 25 has fewer pictures and more names—Kisling, Chirico, Delaunay, Jean-Gabriel Domergue, Foujita, Gris, Leger, Lurçat, Marcousis, Pascin, Picabia, Tcheltchew, and many more who are not included at the Orangerie. There are robes by Poiret and Lanvin, Vionnet and Reboux. There is a Peugeot and a Voisin, both 1925 models; theatre and costume design by Bakst, Benoit (who did Petroushka), Lepape and Erté; Stravinsky's beautifully calligraphed manuscript of the *Sacre:* and Diaghilev's death mask in bronze. Along with this, great quantities of furniture and decoration of the period, both from France and from Germany and the north.

It is easy to see from the furniture here which side came out on top in World War I. The good French work is in the *style riche,* signed by great and respectable houses like Lanvin, Ruhlmann et Laurent, Süe et Mare and Baccarat, and by designers like Meré, Lalique, Iribe, Jensen and Fabergé. They are *articles de luxe,* made with the richest materials and the most expert workmanship, the lines derived from a mixture of traditional motifs and *art nouveau.* The German and Dutch work is decidedly in the *style pauvre,* clearly planned to be mass-produced out of the most ordinary materials by not particularly skillful workmen. The design itself is based on a simplified form of cubism; the designers are the great modern architects, the De Stijl group, and the students and faculty of the Bauhaus, peo-

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ple like Breuer, Gropius, Mies van de Rohe, Moholy-Nagy and the French Le Corbusier. These are architects, not cabinet workers, more accustomed to work in flat layout than in actual wood and metal, and the execution of the pieces is competent but dry.

For the needs of the luxury trades, the wood is sometimes precious and the metal chrome. But mostly the materials are nickeled tubing and plywood, surfaced with veneer. After forty years, pieces like the chrome-steel-and-leather chairs of Le Corbusier, made with good materials, have lasted. Most of it has not stood up so well. For example, the dining room set designed by Marcel Breuer for the painter Kandinsky (both of the Bauhaus) with the latter's help and advice—rectangles and rounds of plyboard, lacquered black and white and mounted on metal pipes—is hard, ugly and certainly most uncomfortable. And the "chaise Berlinoise" of G.T. Rietveld, also in plyboard and black and white lacquer, looks like the work of an ingenious child who had some odds and ends of lumber but no saw to cut them with, and therefore put them together as he could.

None of this can bear comparison in style or quality with the luxury products the French were turning out—for example, the bathroom by Jeanne Lanvin in yellow and white Sienna marble and green patined bronze. Just the same, the world we live in and the styles available today owe much more to the Bauhaus than to Lanvin.

The Guillaume-Walter collection at the Orangerie has a family resemblance to the Barnes collection in Philadelphia; they are of the same period. There are sixteen Cézannes, twenty-four Renoirs, a Gauguin, a Monet, a Sisley and a Van Dongen, nine Henri Rousseaus and ten Henri Matisses, twenty-six Derains, twelve Picassos, ten Utrillos, twenty-eight Soutines, some Marie Laurencins and Modiglianis. All, with the exception of Soutine, were names particularly famous in the 1920s when Paul Guillaume, a young and brilliant picture merchant, was making his name and forming his collection. Since that time, the reputations of Marie Laurencin and Derain have somewhat diminished. Soutine's has climbed, and Van Dongen's has held steady. Only the most famous of the works exposed are familiar, and then only from reproduction. Coming upon them for the first time, and with the other exhibition still in mind, one is inclined to regard them less as valuable collectors' items than as picturesque examples of the taste of an epoch, and to judge them according to how well they still hold our interest.

As a whole, the Cézannes, the Renoirs and the Matisses stand up best. The pictures here were chosen with a sure eye and with love, not so much as investments but as pictures to be lived with. One of the most beautiful of the Cézannes is a small head and shoulders of the artist's son at the age of 8 or 9, with highly simplified, quite sculptural forms. The still lifes, particularly the small ones, are all excellent. There is a well-known portrait of Mme. Cézanne seated, and two tiny paintings of nudes in landscape—"Nymphs by the Sea"—quite unexpectedly reminiscent of Fragonard or Watteau. The landscapes from the country around Aix-en-Provence are somewhat dead in color. But then the color of that landscape is itself not particularly subtle or varied.

The twenty-four Renoirs comprise one of the best collections of that artist's work I have yet seen. There are most wonderful portraits of children, and the famous picture of two girls at a piano, perhaps the most successful version of a subject he used so often. The colors of all the Renoirs seem a little faded. One has the impression that the varnish has dirtied, or perhaps the brown of an underpaint is eating through. The Matisses, like those of the Cone collection in Baltimore, come principally from the years 1918 to 1925; they are smaller and more intimate pictures than he painted later, and all of exceptional quality.

The twelve Picassos, on the contrary, are an uneven mixture. There is the famous "l'Etreinte" of 1902—a large, gray-toned pastel once owned by Vollard—representing two standing nudes, a man and a pregnant woman, embracing, their faces hidden in each other's shoulders; the extraordinary "Femme au Peigne," a nude in tones of red and gray, massively sculptural, and with a very curious foreshortening as if seen slightly from above. It was painted in 1908 in the early "Negro" style, very like the head in the Gertrude Stein portrait in the Metropolitan. There is a tiny sketch of "Three Women at a Fountain" of 1926 in red-earth colors, charming and very Greek; and a monumental and impressive "Grande Baigneuse," also a neo-Greek, Pompeian evocation. Its companion piece, "Grand Nu à la Draperie," less successful, is spoiled by a badly painted hand. The same sort of wooden left hand and arm mars the otherwise delightful "Femme au Chapeau Blanc." The hands with sausage fingers which appear in so many of Picasso's pictures of the 1920s—influenced, I am sure, by certain of the Cézanne portraits—have not aged well. They are beginning to appear willfully manneristic, even incompetent, as though he were using an acrobatic trick to get out of a difficulty—which is exactly what Max Jacob once accused him of.

The Marie Laurencins are more complex than those generally encountered and are period pieces indeed. There is a sweet and poetic representation of Mlle. Chanel with bird and poodle, and a pensive Mme. Paul Guillaume with flowers and another kind of dog. The Utrillos are early; there are two cathedrals, one extremely fine. The one Van Dongen is a portrait of Paul Guillaume and no more convincing as a work of art than any other fashionable commissioned portrait; it is a pitifully poor example to present of such a brilliant painter. On the other hand, the portrait of Guillaume by Modigliani is a vivid, convincing depiction of a forceful, capricious and acute personality.

The twenty-eight Soutines include many of the well-known portraits—"Le Petit Patissier," "La Jeune Anglaise," "L'Enfant du Choeur" and the "Garçon d'Etage," frightening and oppressive in their nightmarelike presence. There is also a series of still lifes of skinned, dead animals, and of landscapes of villages. The landscapes seem to wear the least well. They are all the same color—snarled threads of brightest yellow, orange, red, green and blue—and the wave-surface distortion systematically imposed on all the forms renders the works unnecessarily dramatic for their subject matter—like someone suddenly shouting "boo" in your ear. The nine Rousseaus also have not worn well; perhaps because the collection presents the "cuter" side of Rousseau's talent. The color is labored, the drawing ignorant, and the pictures all too well known. The joke, I am afraid, has now worn thin.

The most uneven of all are the Derains; they are by far the weakest part of the collection. Unfortunately, perhaps, one sees the best one first. It is hung in the entrance to the exhibition, a huge, square, 6-foot canvas displaying a Harlequin and a Pierrot with sympathetic, ugly faces, against a background of sky and barren plain, laboriously dancing a jig. It is most

THE CUP

A water tower to stand
for monumental thirst
straddles our graveyard,
bears the town's name and
brims with iron-red hard
water, a toast raised up
to common things we die
without. Across the flat land
we see that landmark first
when we turn homeward, come to lie
down under that lifted cup.

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beautifully conceived and beautifully executed, the picture from which the work of Balthus must certainly derive. Equally fine are the half-dozen landscapes of the south of France, in warm colors and solid painting. The four nudes are monstrous and badly drawn, the still lifes thin, the portraits superficial and all, for the most part, executed in hasty, liquid brushwork.

Clearly, it is with pictures just as with furniture. If a piece is to strike its epoch as a modern work, it must embody a new idea. But a bright new idea is always so quickly copied that one is never sure who the inventor was. So that if the piece itself is to last, it must be made with the best materials and the best workmanship. The final judgment, however, is something else again. As Matisse was overheard to mutter to himself at a Picasso retrospective, "After all, it is the gift that counts."

RECORDS / Benjamin Boretz

DIAMOND: String Quartet No. 4. BARBER: String Quartet Op. 11. Beaux-Arts String Quartet. Epic LC 3907/BC 1307.

The Diamond Fourth Quartet is certainly not for the casual listener; in fact, I suspect it is not for the listener at all. What it mainly conveys is a determination to compose a whole long piece in the face of insuperable deficiences of technique and idea. It proceeds in the manner of a real piece, becoming loud and soft, thick and thin, fast and slow, active and sustained by turns—doing, in short, all the external things that musical compositions traditionally do in the course of articulating relations of ideas. But it does them without having anything to articulate, so that they come in no particular order and with no evident local or overall qualities. The result is like a very long dramatic monologue, full of inflections and gestures, in which none of the word successions make sense. As a listening experience, the fascination with the fact that such a phenomenon can actually take place is severely limited, and this quartet extends considerably beyond that limit.

The legend that the enormous promise revealed in Samuel Barber's student music remained unfulfilled in his later works is clearly belied by his String Quartet, which is an early work that quite unmistakably forecasts all the facile dullness of mature Barber. On the other hand, the capacity to formulate polished sonorities that is evident in such recent works as *Vanessa* and the Piano Concerto (though far from equally in all others) is also present throughout the Quartet, and not just in the notoriously slick *Adagio* (later the *Adagio for Strings*). The Beaux-Arts Quartet, even in this minimal challenge to their capacities, seem impressive enough to arouse one's interest in their subsequent activities.

IVES: Symphony No. 4. American Symphony Orchestra; Leopold Stokowski, cond. Columbia ML 6175/MS 6775.

The current enthusiasm for the Ives Fourth Symphony as a *locus classicus* of compositional originality strikes me as particularly obtuse. For here, even more than elsewhere in Ives, the extreme surface complexity emerges as uncorrelated complication rather than as significant relational depth, and is thus always a purely textural rather than a structural factor. The constant contradiction between the elaborateness of the presented surface and the literalness—or imperceptibility—of internal relation produces an unclarity that is surely the precise converse of originality in any sense. As ever, there are unquestionably striking local moments; but as ever, their obvious suggestiveness remains unrealized except in the works of other composers. Moreover, the claim that Ives fathered a wide spectrum of "advanced" American music seems unwarranted; except for a few rhythmic ideas suggested to Carter, his uncritical pendulation between primitive homespun simplicity and unmitigated chaos seems far more generative of the Cowell-Harris-Cage periphery than of the best recent American music. Ives contrived, here as elsewhere, to articulate juxtapositions of highly differentiated events, but they are forever "different events" rather than multiple aspects of a single idea, and hence cannot be distinguished from any fortuitous conjunction of either these or any other separate musical contexts. Such an absence of discriminative bases virtually defines musical triviality, and I am unable to find anything in the present recording to make me think of Ives's work in any other terms.

MESSIAEN: *Chronochromie*. KOECHLIN: *Les Bandar-Log*. BOULEZ: *Le soleil des eaux*. B.B.C. Orchestra and Chorus; Antal Dorati (in the Messiaen and Koechlin) and Pierre Boulez (in the Boulez), conds. Angel (S) 36295.

For all its reputation as a work of great complexity and originality in texture and sonority, *Chronochromie* is notable mainly for the one-dimensionality of its events,



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the absence of any real sense of multiple simultaneity even in those sections where the apparent "polyphony" of highly differentiated parts is most extreme. Evidently, the parts entirely cancel out as individual entities, and simply project as a "block" of texture of a certain kind. And this, however initially novel (and it is so only minimally, in the exaggerated emphasis on high-register sonority in general and glockenspiel-xylophone-marimba conjunctions in particular), soon becomes just another unitary, stationary element, sustained long past any point of perceptual function. Moreover, in the alternation of these sections with passages in which the attacks are all in thick monolithic blocks at every point, even in fast figurations (an idea no more "original" here than in Chausson or Honegger) the supposed "chronometric" invention seems like nothing so much as one of those pale imitations of the *Dance Sacrale* from the *Sacre du printemps* that proliferated in the late teens and early twenties.

Boulez, on the other hand, is instantly identifiable as a presence of considerably greater interest, with—at least—ideas for ways to approach all the immediate aspects of his piece: voice-word relations, phrasing, registration (especially), voice-instrumental alternation and conjunction. The quick flicks between extremes of duration, articulation and sonority — without "expressionist" intensity, but simply on-off—are particularly striking, and quite securely controlled despite the relative immaturity of the work in other respects. Thus the denser passages do not quite escape the Honeggerian "noise" that seems an invariant presence in French works of a certain pretentious monumentality. The performance is on a far higher level than those on the rest of the record.

It would be amusing to be able to assert that the overtly old-fashioned Koechlin *Bandar-Log* was no sillier than the pretentiously *avant-garde* Messiaen, but it is, considerably. Most of this piece is plain Hollywood spookery, and the rest is sheer incidental music, about as incidental as music can be. The score does possess a certain historical interest as a compendium of almost every cliché of bad French academicism, from slippery chromatics to obligatory fugues, of which its inordinate length is an essential aspect as well.

BRITTEN: *Cantata Misericordium* (1963). *Sinfonia da Requiem.* Peter Pears, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, soloists; London Symphony Orchestra and Chorus; Benjamin Britten, cond. London 5937/25937.

The *Cantata Misericordium* is one of the more refined, if less elaborately contrived, works by this master of *musique d'occasion,* turned out in his best minor-league Stravinsky manner, making all the appropriate noises and evoking all the right historical-musical associations, with the consummate professionalism of a master popularizer. The *Sinfonia da Requiem* is not only from a much earlier period, thus manifesting considerably less compositional finesse but also represents a less agreeable aspect of Britten's activity in its pretensions to profundity and official "expressive" grandeur.

STRAVINSKY: *Le sacre du printemps.* Four Etudes for Orchestra. Orchestre National de la Radio-Télévision Française; Pierre Boulez, cond. Nonesuch H-1093/H-71093.

This is a very special performance of the *Sacre,* a treasurable conjunction of the wonderful precision and delicacy of French wind ensemble and solo playing with a conductor who demonstrates a deep awareness of and control over every rhythmic articulation and sonorous balance in the score. The textural transparency that results, and the absolute clarity and accuracy in every detail projected through it is an unforgettable experience to one who has known the score for years but never really heard all of it. This quality far outweighs any residual objections to the absence of an equal concern for the projection of long-range continuity and structure that tends to characterize Boulez's conducting. In the Etudes, too, the orchestra's response is so much more precisely adjusted to Boulez's demands than was the B.B.C.'s in their Carnegie Hall performance under him last spring that the interpretative deficiencies noted here at the time simply recede into insignificance beside the sheer virtuosity of the ensemble playing.

BERG: *Wozzeck.* Evelyn Lear, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau; Karl Christian Kolin, Helmut Melchert, Gerhard Stolze, Fritz Wunderlich, soloists. Chorus and Orchestra of the Deutschen Oper, Berlin; Karl Böhm, cond. DGG 991-92.

The formidable mechanical difficulties of performing *Wozzeck* are past history; but its very accessibility to the technical capacities of conventional performers now also subjects it to the conventionalization they impose on everything they perform, and thus raises a new, interpretative crisis of even more formidable proportions. When Mitropoulos recorded *Wozzeck,* for example, it was still impossible (at least for the Philharmonic) really to *play* it, and much of the work had to be suggestively "faked" to give some indication of the qualities of the missing and distorted events. What emerged was surely not *Wozzeck,* but a rather powerful conceptual image of its musical identity. Böhm's performance, on the other hand, is completely out of the Mitropoulos class in its largely reliable—and hence valuable—documentation of the score for the first time on records. But its accomplishment of this through the subjugation of every unique configurational and successional quality of the work into a smooth, efficiently propelled "standard-repertory" featurelessness raises the awful possibility of a new performance "tradition" for 20th-century opera that may require another Mahler to restore it once again to the domain of significant musical experience.

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